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This study addresses one central question: what are the current characteristics in 
Chinese foreign economic policymaking that have facilitated its cooperative economic 
policies with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as exemplified in the 
endorsement of a framework ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA)? 
Those characteristics are searched at both international and domestic levels. 
Statistics show that Sino-ASEAN economic relations have been growing very fast despite 
disadvantages in their natural endowments in economic relations. This indicates that 
ASEAN enjoys strategic priority in China’s foreign economic relations.   
On the international level, this study argues that respect and manageability are the 
two central themes when China decides policies on regional and international economic 
arrangements. The hypothesis of respect and manageability is tested by studying several 
cases of China’s policies towards regional and international economic arrangements since 
the 1990s. Likewise, China has pursued economic cooperation with ASEAN because it 
brings high international respect to China and at the same time enables China to keep 
considerable manageability over national and regional policy decisions. ACFTA is 
particularly an ideal arrangement for China to achieve the two objectives.  
On the domestic level, the characteristics of Chinese foreign economic 
policymaking process facilitated the domestic approval on the ACFTA. Chinese policy 
making on ACFTA was highly centralized. This was reinforced by two other features: the 
intellectual support from the Chinese experts, and strategic and political inputs into the 
policymaking process.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Background 
As a growing country, China’s foreign policy is undergoing gradual but 
substantial changes. It is no longer a closed-door feudal society, nor is it an exporter of 
the Communist revolution. As it gradually integrates into the world, China develops 
cooperative relations with various international actors, as is exemplified in its economic 
cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The origins and 
sources of such foreign economic policies are crucial for understanding China’s regional 
and international behaviours, as well as the political economy of Sino-ASEAN relations.  
China and ASEAN started economic cooperation under the impetus of economic 
regionalism, a prominent character of the world political economy in the late 20th century. 
The vast majority of WTO members are party to one or more regional trade agreements. 
By July 2003, only three WTO members — Macau China, Mongolia and Chinese Taipei 
— were not party to any regional trade agreement. The surge of these agreements has 
continued unabated since the early 1990s. By May 2003, over 265 had been notified to 
the WTO (and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade), of which 
138 were notified after creation of WTO in January 1995.1 
Economic regionalisms take various forms and levels of integration, including 
free trade agreements, custom unions, common markets or economic unions. The Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) means abolishment of trade barriers (usually tariffs) between 
partner countries. However, each member determines its own external trade barrier with 
                                                 
1 Webpage of the World Trade Organization: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm 
March 20, 2004. 
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non-FTA members independently. A typical example of an FTA is the North America 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The next level of integration is the Custom Union 
where a common external trade policy (e.g. common external tariff regime) is adopted by 
member countries. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) between Brazil, 
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay represents such an arrangement. Common Markets like 
the European Community adopt further provisions to facilitate the free movement of 
factors of production like labour and capital, and the harmonization of trading and 
technical standards across member countries. Finally, Economic Unions such as the 
European Union (EU), extend the harmonization to fiscal and monetary policies. The 
common currency Euro came into use in January 2002. EU is usually regarded as the 
paradigm for regional cooperation and integration. Its development was marked by 
binding agreements and institutions, in which the member states surrendered a number of 
public policy issues to the supra-national level. Whether regionalism is a building block 
or stumbling block for global trade liberalization is still a controversial topic, but regional 
preferential arrangements at the current stage may cause worries of other non-member 
countries as they will be treated discriminatorily and become more vulnerable without a 
group of their own. 
While regional economic arrangements in Europe and America have achieved 
much progress in institution building, economic regionalism in Asia lacks formal and 
credible mechanisms. In contrast to the EU, the Asian way of international cooperation is 
known for informality and looseness. The paradigm of institutionalism in Europe was 
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challenged by “open regionalism” in the Asia Pacific. 2  “Open regionalism” is the 
principle of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a pan-Pacific inter-
governmental forum. APEC operates on the basis of non-binding commitments and open 
dialogues to promote open and free trade, even without clear definition of geographic 
scope or membership criteria. Before the Asian Financial Crisis, the fast growth of the 
West Pacific economies supported the appraisal of an Asian way of achieving shared 
economic success and regional integration without institutionalization as the Europeans 
did. At the Bogor meeting in 1994, the APEC leaders adopted the 'Bogor Goals' of free 
and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies 
and 2020 for developing economies. 
The Asian Financial Crisis brought East Asian countries to alternative thoughts 
other than the non-discriminatory, non-binding and loose economic cooperation. 
Incompetence of IMF and APEC in stopping the disastrous contagion disappointed the 
East Asian countries. The sincerity of US and the ability of APEC in promoting Asian 
economy were put into doubt. The East Asian countries came to realize the necessity of 
stronger cooperation within the region. There have been many efforts. Notably, ASEAN 
committed itself to the realization of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008. The 
first informal ASEAN+3 (APT) Summit was held in 1997 among ten ASEAN countries, 
China, South Korea and Japan. It has become an annual event since then and a major 
channel to discuss East Asian cooperation. But pessimism about the realization of a real 
                                                 
2 Drysdale, Peter, Andrew Elek and Hadi Soesastro. “Open Regionalism: The Nature of Asia Pacific 
Integration.” In Europe, East Asia and APEC: A Shared Global Agenda?, edited by Peter Drysdale and 
David Vines, 103-135. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.  
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Asian economic group existed within the region and without.3 Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir’s proposal of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) failed because of 
objection from the US, and was downgraded to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 
a consultation forum within APEC. Japan’s proposal of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
excluding US was also shelved in the face of opposition from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The pessimism over a substantial Asian cooperation group was based on 
several factors, such as the heterogeneity of the Asian countries, the doubtful existence of 
an Asian identity, the intervention from external forces, the informal style of Asian 
diplomacy, and political and economic rivalries between some regional powers. 4 
However, a breakthrough was made by China and ASEAN in November 2001 
when they signed the Framework Agreement for Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, 
aiming to strengthen cooperation in several areas, including the realization of an 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in 10 years. This agreement caused 
surprises at home and abroad, as well as a wave of free trade agreements in the region, 
such as the Japan-ASEAN free trade talks, Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and 
US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. 
                                                 
3 See for example Webber, Douglas. “Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism 
in East Asia and Asia-Pacific After the Asia Crisis.” Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (August, 2001), pp. 
339-372. 
4 See for example, Webber, Douglas. “Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism 
in East Asia and Asia-Pacific After the Asia Crisis.” Ibid. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. “Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. In Network Power: 
Japan and Asia, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, 1-44. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997. 
Higgott, Richard and Richard Stubbs. “Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC Versus 
EAEC in the Asia Pacific.” Review of International Political Economy 2:3 (Summer 1995), pp. 530–31. 
Stubbs, Richard. “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol.42, No.3 
(2002).  
Haggard, Stephan. “The Political Economy of Regionalism in Asia and the Americas.” In The Political 
Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, 21-47. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997. 
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As far as ACFTA is concerned, it is also a breakthrough in Sino-ASEAN relations. 
Since the People’s Republic of China was established, there have been various political 
and security conflicts between China and ASEAN countries. Conflicts occurred because 
of China’s support for communist movements, China’s invasion of Vietnam, the problem 
of local ethnic Chinese, and the South China Sea territorial disputes. The relationship 
between ASEAN and China started a new page in July 1991 when the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen attended the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Since then, China 
has been engaged with ASEAN in economic, security and political talks. In July 1996, 
China was accorded full Dialogue Partner status. China also participates in a series of 
consultative meetings with ASEAN which includes the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
the Post-Ministerial Conferences, the Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, the 
ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting Consultations and the ASEAN-China Business 
Council Meeting. The ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee was established in 
1997 to coordinate all the ASEAN-China mechanisms at the working level and to further 
consolidate the economic and functional cooperation between ASEAN and China. 
Economic interactions in trade and investment have been growing steadily. However, no 
formal or substantial mechanism of cooperation was predicted. As Lee pointed out, 
“China’s size, geographic proximity, ethnic outreach, modernization and lack of 
transparency in defence policies will always create real and imagined problems for the 
ASEAN states.”5  
 
 
                                                 
5 Lee, Lai To. “China’s Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?” Pacifica Review, Vol. 13, 
No. 1, February 2001. 
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Puzzles and Research Question 
The signing of the ACFTA by China gives rise to several puzzles. Firstly, it 
should be noted that such kind of move in foreign policy was unprecedented for China. 
China had never signed a free trade agreement with any country or any multilateral party. 
It had advocated the policy of non-alignment since the 1950s. In China’s participation in 
international organizations, it stressed autonomy and sovereignty, which resulted in a 
diplomatic record of informality. Why did China sign ACFTA with ASEAN? Does it 
imply a sharp deviation of Chinese overall foreign policy strategy? Why did not Beijing 
sign FTA agreement firstly with other countries like Japan or the US, which had closer 
economic interactions with China? 
Secondly, one of the arguments in international political economy maintains that 
the feasibility of creating a regional agreement depends on similarity in economic or 
political institutions of prospective members.6 If the argument of Stephan Haggard is true 
that different domestic systems impede cooperation, 7   how could the heterogeneous 
countries in ACFTA achieve an agreement? Does it imply a need to refine this theory? 
Are some other factors more crucial? 
Thirdly, because ACFTA would probably cause certain domestic sectors in China 
to suffer from the competition from ASEAN products, did all domestic sectors support 
the government’s proposal? Considering they might constitute an important group, why 
could not they prevent its signing? 
                                                 
6  For example, Nogues, Julio J. and Rosalinda Quintanilla. “Latin America’s Integration and the 
Multilateral Trading System.” In New Dimensions in Regional Integration, edited by Jaime de Melo and 
Arvind Panagariya, 278-313. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
7 Haggard, Stephan. “The Political Economy of Regionalism in Asia and the Americas.” In The Political 
Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, 21-47. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997. 
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Fourthly, WTO and APEC always advocate inclusive trade liberalization instead 
of exclusive trade blocs. Countries such as Japan or US might also oppose to regional 
arrangements in which they were excluded. There were infertile initiatives such as the 
EAEG mainly because of the reluctance or objection of the two countries. Could these 
international actors prevent China’s decision? 
To solve the above puzzles, a close look at China’s foreign economic 
policymaking is needed. Foreign economic policymaking involves the objective and 
process when a state makes policy on its foreign economic relations. The leading 
research question is: What are the current characteristics in China’s economic foreign 




To answer the research question, discussions in four fields are most relevant: 
foreign policy analysis, regional economic cooperation, Chinese foreign policymaking 
and political economy of Sino-ASEAN relations.  
 
Foreign policy analysis 
Since foreign economic relations are part of a country’s foreign relations, 
literature on foreign policy analysis is enlightening for the study of foreign economic 
policymaking, which is the main task of this thesis.  Foreign policymaking refers to the 
formulation of a country’s foreign policy. It involves how and why foreign policies are 
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made. There are two major approaches in foreign policy analysis: rational choice 
approach and institutional approach.  
The rational choice approach emphasizes the external determinants of foreign 
policy, regarding a country as a unit. It holds that nation states make rational choice 
among possible alternatives to maximize utility. This approach has developed a lot in 
response to two key criticisms to its assumptions: the knowledge available to actors 
(bounded rationality8 ), and subjective judgments of individuals (subjective expected 
utility). 9  
The institutional approach stresses the structures and functions of governmental 
and societal institutions. 10 The most influential two models of this approach focus on the 
governmental machine: the organizational process model and bureaucratic politics model. 
The organizational process model envisages governmental behaviour less as a matter of 
deliberate choice and more as independent outputs of several large, key organizations, 
only partly coordinated by government leaders. The bureaucratic politics model, on the 
other hand, hypothesizes intense competitions among decision making units, and foreign 
policy is the outcome of bargaining among the different components of a bureaucracy. In 
an oft-quoted aphorism by Graham Allison: “Where you stand depends on where you 
sit.” 11 
                                                 
8 Simon argues that with limited information and time, and given limited attention and even interest, 
individuals use standard operating devices as shorthand to rational action. Simon, H. Models of Bounded 
Rationality, Vol. 2. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982. 
9 Opp emphasizes “soft incentives” in what he calls subjective expected utility theory (SEU), to refer to the 
utility not attached to materials. Opp, K.D. “Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the 
Anti-nuclear Movement.” British Journal of Political Science, 16(1986): 87-112. 
10 See Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1971. 
11 Ibid, p.144. 
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James N. Rosenau’s conceptual framework of linkage politics has profoundly 
influenced the conceptual reorganization and integration of comparative analysis of 
foreign policy. It aims to prevent the gap between comparative and international politics. 
Linkage is defined by Rosenau as the “recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in 
one system and is reacted to in another.”12 It is treated as the unit of analysis in his study 
of foreign policy making. By studying the linkages between domestic politics and foreign 
policies, this theoretical approach tries to explain adaptations of a country’s foreign 
policies to the environmental changes. There are two questions with this perspective if it 
is applied to the study of Chinese foreign policymaking: first, how to operationalize and 
measure the core concepts; second, whether the two way exchange dynamism has 
developed substantially with the reality in China. 
This paper argues that a correct understanding of China’s foreign economic policy 
should be based on both the external and internal analyses. Highlighting Beijing’s 
constant overall diplomatic strategy is necessary for understanding and predicting its 
behaviours in several specific issues. In the meantime, characteristics of the 
policymaking system are important for explaining the results of policy outcomes. 
 
Regional economic cooperation 
Regional economic cooperation is one kind of foreign policy strategy. 
Accordingly, explanations on the formation of regional economic arrangements are 
usually divided into two approaches: that from the international system, and that from 
domestic institutions.  
                                                 
12 Rosenau, James N. “Toward the Study of National-International Linkages.” In Linkage Politics: Essays 
on the Convergence of National and International Systems, edited by James N. Rosenau, 45. New York: 
The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1974. 
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The international approach regards states as unitary actors which calculate the 
benefits of FTA in the international environment. Neorealism, functionalism, 
institutionalism and constructivism are the main theories.  
Neorealism emphasizes power relations, and regards three factors influential in 
the political economy of regionalism: concerns of the asymmetric distribution of gains; 13 
political or military relations; 14  existence or erosion of hegemon. 15  If neorealism is 
applied to China’s policy on ASEAN, the assumptions could be: the parties of ACFTA 
expected symmetric distribution of gains; it regards ASEAN as a political or potential 
ally; and, China viewed US hegemony to be eroding in Asia. Whether these assumptions 
are true needs empirical testing. In fact, although China and ASEAN governments 
emphasized ACFTA would be a win-win game, several ASEAN members had 
reservations as to its economic implications. Moreover, influence of the US is still 
regarded very important by ASEAN countries. 
Functionalism and neofunctionalism posit that governments tend to forge 
international institutions in order to meet various functional needs. They argue that 
expansion of economic activity creates welfare incentives for states to further liberalize 
and standardize economic exchange.16 Accordingly, these functionalism views hold that 
                                                 
13 For example, Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique fo the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42(1988): 485-507.  
14 Gowa, Joanne. Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
15 For example, Gilpin, Robert. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of 
Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Basic Books, 1975.  
Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987. 
Krasner, Stephen D. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World Politics 28(1976): 317-
347. 
Grieco, Joseph M. “Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East 
Asia, and the Americas.” In The Political Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and 
Helen V. Milner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 
16 For example: Deutch, Karl W. et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.  
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increased trade and investment ties propelled the Chinese and Southeast Asian 
governments to cooperate. However, increased trade and investment were not only 
between China and ASEAN, but between China and several other countries. Moreover, 
why the government prefers regionalism to global liberalization is not explained. 
Neo-liberal institutionalism highlights that international institutions create 
incentives for states to cooperate by reducing collective action problems, by enhancing 
the prospects for states to engage in strategies of reciprocity, and by increasing the costs 
for states of failing to comply with established rules and norms.17 With ACFTA, did 
China expect reciprocity from ASEAN? Or did China want to assure ASEAN of its 
sincerity in cooperation? 
Constructivism stresses the importance of communal identity in forming regions. 
For Kupchan, regions are the ideational products of states sharing a sense of communal 
identity.18 Did China feel a shared identity with ASEAN and was it a factor in China’s 
policy of economic cooperation with ASEAN? It is doubtful whether there is a shared 
East Asian identity. China and ASEAN countries are very heterogeneous in culture, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958.  
17  For example: Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions.” In Cooperation Under Anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986.  
Keohane Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984. 
Lipson, Charles. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” World Politics 37(1984): 
1-23.  
Oye, Kenneth A. “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies. In Cooperation 
Under Anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 
Stein, Arthur A. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World.” In International 
Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.  
18 Kupchan, Charles. “Regionalizing Europe's Security: The Case for a New Mitteleuropa.” In The Political 
Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997. 
Drysdale, Peter, Andrew Elek and Hadi Soesastro. “Open Regionalism: The Nature of Asia Pacific 
Integration.” In Europe, East Asia and APEC: A Shared Global Agenda?, edited by Peter Drysdale and 
David Vines, 103-135. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
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politics, geography and ethnicity. The Asian financial crisis may have strengthened the 
call for a stronger regional cohesion, but the basis of a shared regional identity still seems 
too fragile. 
Domestic analysis suggests that preferences of policymakers and the nature of 
domestic institutions contribute to regional economic cooperation. Mansfield, Milner and 
Rosendorff argue that the likelihood of states cooperating on trade policy depends 
crucially on their regime type: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly 
likely to conclude trade agreements. 19  Helen Milner also argues that the greater a 
country’s economic openness, the more favourable its leaders should be towards 
international economic cooperation, because leaders must balance the policies that 
enhance their electoral prospects with those that meet the demands of special interest 
groups.20 However, it is debatable whether a democratic regime is easier to participate in 
free trade agreements than an authoritarian one. In fact, in democratic states in Asia such 
as Japan and India, domestic negotiations are usually constraints to such a policy. The 
case of the Chinese political system will provide empirical evidence for the relationship 
between domestic conditions and regional economic cooperation. 
 
Chinese foreign policymaking 
Literature on China’s foreign policymaking mostly studies the domestic structure, 
institutions and process. Because of the excessive secrecy with which China guards its 
                                                 
19 Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. “Why Democracies Cooperate More: 
Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” International Organization 56(Summer 2002): 
477-513. 
20  Helen, Milner V. “Regional Economic Co-operation, Global Markets and Domestic Politics: A 
Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty.” In Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: 
Europe, Asia and the Americas, edited by William D. Coleman and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill. London and 
New York: Routledge, 1998. 
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foreign-policy decision making, its structure, mechanisms, and processes have always 
been more or less an enigma to the Western scholars and even to its neighbouring 
countries. Although there has been a wealth of Western literature on this topic since 1949, 
few authors have dealt directly with foreign-policy making. The few studies that do focus 
on the issue unveil the formal structure of China’s foreign policy establishment but 
generally fall short of explaining the internal mechanisms and dynamics of the policy 
making process. 
The path-breaking work was Barnett’s The Making of Foreign Policy in China: 
Structure and Process.21 Through interviews in China in the 1980s, he pieces together an 
institutional picture and process of the foreign policymaking of a newly opened PRC. He 
describes the shift in top-level decision making from the Politburo to the Party Secretariat 
and the State Council. He also observes the trends of regularization and 
professionalization in the policymaking process. He points out the fundamental shift of 
Chinese foreign policy emphasis in the early 1980s—from ideologically-motivated 
revolutionary policies to pragmatic problem-solving approaches with economic aims. 
However, whether the status and trends continued in the 1990s deserves further study 
since China’s political and economic situations have changed tremendously. Moreover, 
how the foreign economic policies were made, or how they were coordinated with 
political policies were not clear. 
Lu Ning fills part of the gap in the 1990s, centring on the politico-military aspect 
of foreign policy making mechanisms and dynamics. But the making of foreign economic 
decisions both at the centre and at local levels is dealt with only very briefly. He explains 
                                                 
21 Barnett, A. Doak. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process. Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1985. 
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that “foreign economic decision making is such a complex and dynamic area of inquiry 
following a decade and a half of reforms and decentralization that it is necessary to deal 
with the subject in a separate study.”22  
Michael Oksenberg and Kenneth Lieberthal describe the sophisticated and 
intensive bargaining between several ministries in the decision making on the Three 
Gorges Project in the 1980s. The policy outcome was believed to be the result of power 
struggle of related ministries in efforts to maximize their respective interests.23 However, 
since the issue of energy directly involves interests of several ministries, it is questionable 
whether such struggles exist in other issue areas. In China, foreign economic policies 
used to be a privilege of very few elites and do not often appear to involve much direct 
interests of these elites. But, with increasingly intensive interactions with the global 
economy, foreign economic policies became closely related to many ministries, such as 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and 
ministries for various industries. Whether intensive ministerial struggle exists between 
these industries now and whether it bears crucial weight on the final foreign policy 
decisions in the 1990s are interesting topics for further inquiry. 
David Lampton studies major trends in China’s foreign policymaking, including 
foreign economic policymaking, since Deng Xiaoping launched the open-door policy in 
1978 until the end of the twentieth century.24 He holds that in the 1990s, China’s foreign 
policymaking was undergoing several major changes: professionalization, 
internationalization, decentralization and democratization. He observes that during 
                                                 
22 Lu, Ning. The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision Making in China. 2d ed., 2. Westview Press, 2000. 
23 Oksenberg, Michael and Kenneth Lieberthal. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
24 Lampton, David. “Introduction.” In The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform, 1978-2000, edited by David Lampton. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2000. 
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China’s reform period, increasingly more actors managed to get involved in the process 
of China’s foreign policymaking on an expanding range of issues. Academicians, the 
public, local governments, various ministries and foreign actors all found channels to 
express their preferences and interests. Whether China’s foreign economic policymaking 
bears the above mentioned changes and whether it is the case with the economic policies 
over ASEAN need to be tested. 
 
The political economy of Sino-ASEAN relations 
Literature on the political economy of Sino-ASEAN relations deals with policy 
considerations from the perspectives of both sides. Studies until the middle 1990s were 
mainly on security, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Studies on their political and 
economic relations grew since China normalized relations with Singapore and Indonesia 
in the early 1990s. Especially with China’s economic growth, major works were 
questioning whether China would become a rival or a partner for ASEAN countries. 
Little study has been done on how China’s foreign economic policy towards ASEAN was 
made. However, it is crucial to know about the policymaking mechanism, the actors and 
their interests in order to explain China’s behaviour or predict future cooperation. 
After China’s proposal of ACFTA, there were many works analyzing China’s 
policy considerations. The following points with their reasoning are usually found 
commonly in such analyses.25  
China’s main economic motivations are: 
                                                 
25 For example: Huang, Kwei-Bo. “The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Background, Framework and 
Political Implications.” Peace Forum Essays. Taiwan: National Chengchi University, 2001.  
Sheng, Lijun. “China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and Strategic Motivations.” ISEAS 
Working Paper: International Politics & Security Issues Series No. 1 (2003). 
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 To increase China’s GDP and its trade volume with ASEAN. Economic 
growth is China’s first national goal, and its economy is continuing to open up to the 
world. Economic growth is at the same time the major foundation for Beijing’s regime 
legitimacy. 
 To promote East Asian economic integration in order to prevent against 
economic crises. Having learned a lesson from the Asian Financial Crisis, China realized 
her need for a cooperative mechanism to ensure economic security. 
 To create investment and trade opportunities for the western region of 
China by developing China’s economic relations with ASEAN countries. This is in line 
with China’s strategy of developing its western region. 
China’s political motivations and their reasoning are analyzed as follows: 
 To compete with Japan for leadership in East Asia. ACFTA was an 
opportunity to replace Japan as the primary driving force for economic growth and 
integration of East Asia. Since Japan was the main investor and export market for 
ASEAN, it was difficult for China to compete with Japan for economic leadership in the 
past. However, ACFTA might become the main mechanism for a new stage of economic 
growth in Asia, and a start of the institution building of East Asian regionalism. 
 To weaken the US influence in Southeast Asia and challenge US world 
hegemony. The US maintains military power in Southeast Asia. It is also one of the most 
important investor and market for ASEAN economies. Since the US advocates APEC 
instead of an exclusive East Asian grouping, ACFTA would be a tool for China to 
promote a multi-polar world. 
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 To marginalize Taiwan in regional affairs. With membership in ACFTA, 
China would have the right to accept or deny Taiwan’s participation in regional 
cooperation frameworks. Then Beijing would be able to push Taipei to the negotiation 
table if Taiwan’s room for economic development is compressed. 
 To increase China’s influence in Southeast Asia. ACFTA might help to 
dissolve the fear of China threat that China’s entry into WTO would intensify the Sino-
ASEAN competitions in trade and investment. China for the first time in history found “a 
point of engagement” with ASEAN.26 
Other explanations also include that China was trying to resume the tributary 
system as it had in the ancient times. Some hold that China was giving out short term 
benefits to ASEAN in expectation of long-term benefits. Or, there was an agenda behind 
the diplomatic benevolence: China had the ambition to become the regional hegemon.27 
Careful inquiry is needed to test the validity of those above assertions. Another 
crucial problem with such explanations is that they are limited in the scope of the 
Southeast Asian region, or only to the specific policy of ACFTA. The characteristics of 
China’s foreign economic policymaking are not distilled for better explanation or 
prediction of China’s various behaviours. An in-depth understanding of Beijing’s overall 
foreign policy strategy in China’s integration into the regional and world political 
economy is needed. Moreover, the domestic policymaking structure over China’s 
ASEAN policies is not analyzed. 
This paper argues that foreign economic policymaking should be best understood 
by integrating the analyses on policy considerations and the policymaking process. A 
                                                 
26 Sheng, Lijun. “China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and Strategic Motivations.” 
ISEAS Working Paper: International Politics & Security Issues Series No. 1 (2003). 
27 Author’s interviews with some Southeast Asian scholars from 2002 to 2003. 
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policy is the result of some constant overall goals under specific environmental 
constraints, as well as that of a particular decision process. 
As is pointed out by Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, some major issues 
need further exploration in the study of China’s foreign policy:28  
Firstly, an interdisciplinary approach should be adopted, such as that between 
comparative foreign policy study and international relations theory.  
Secondly, the relative lack of attention to the perception issue in the China field is 
particularly striking. 
Thirdly, more fully discrete types of Chinese external behaviour need to be 
explored, for example, the importance of China’s economic development strategies for its 
foreign policy orientations, and the increased integration of China into various 
international economic regimes. 
 
Organization of Chapters 
This study will undertake the following task: to find out what current 
characteristics in China’s foreign economic policymaking have facilitated its cooperative 
economic policies with ASEAN. More specifically, why and how was the policy of 
ACFTA made? 
Chinese policy considerations of economic cooperation with ASEAN will be 
mostly studied at the international level. Chapter Two will locate ASEAN’s place in the 
map of China’s foreign investment and trade relations. It argues that China propels close 
economic relations with ASEAN mainly out of political and strategic considerations 
                                                 
28 Robinson, Thomas and David Shambaugh, eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, p.8. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
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instead of pursuing economic benefits. Through comparative case studies, Chapter Three 
will test the hypothesis of this study on China’s foreign economic policy considerations. 
The hypothesis is: respect and manageability are the two central concerns in China’s 
calculation when it decides policies on regional and international economic 
arrangements. Chapter Four applies this hypothesis to the case of ACFTA in order to 
argue that China adopted cooperative policies towards ASEAN because it suits the two 
aims very well. 
On the domestic level, China’s policymaking process of ACFTA will be revealed 
in Chapter Five. This is based on the field research conducted by the author in China 
from January to February 2004. Most data were collected through interviews with 
Chinese scholars and officials who were involved in or familiar with the policymaking of 
ACFTA. It is found that the approval of ACFTA was facilitated by the centralization in 
Chinese foreign economic policymaking, which was reinforced by the support of 
experts, and strategic and political inputs. Chapter Six concludes with a summary of the 
study, some observations on current Chinese foreign policymaking and suggestions for 
further study. 
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Chapter 2 ASEAN’s Place in the Map of China’s Foreign Economic Policy 
 
Any foreign economic policymaking of one country is based on its current 
economic relations with other countries. Before analyzing China’s policymaking on 
ASEAN, a clear picture of Sino-ASEAN economic relations needs to be depicted. This 
chapter tries to locate ASEAN’s place in the map of China’s foreign economic policy in 
comparison with that of Japan, US and the EU. Statistical data are used to assess the 
natural endowments of the Chinese and ASEAN economies as a reference for analyzing 
its rapid development in the late 1990s. Was the fast development of Sino-ASEAN 
economic relations driven more by natural endowments of their economies or more by 
the government policies? In economic terms, should ASEAN be the first partner of China 
to form an FTA with? Essentially, the question is asked about whether economic or 
political considerations have dominated China’s economic policymaking on ASEAN. 
In the 1990s, China’s overall state policy followed the path of “reform and 
opening” set out by Deng Xiaoping. Opening up to the outside world, that is, economic 
liberalization, continued to play the central theme in China’s national strategy. Much 
progress has been made, not only quantitatively in trade and investment volumes, but also 
qualitatively in the degree of compliance with international practices. Undoubtedly China 
aims at integrating more with the world economy, but what adequate speed and approach 
to carry out economic liberalization is the question that China is still learning to answer. 
There are many problems and challenges in this process of liberalization, such as the 
redistribution of interests, unbalanced regional developments, income inequality, social 
instability, and international economic competitions. Regime legitimacy was supported 
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by China’s economic growth but on the other hand weakened by those problems. How to 
tackle those problems has received much attention because regime survival is still the 
highest goal of the government. 
Economic liberalization is not perceived as a goal itself by the government but a 
tool for China to realize its overall national strategy. As a result, Chinese decision makers 
associate strategic relations closely with economic relations. Economic relations are seen 
as a useful tool to boost strategic relations. Existing strategic relations provide the context 
for China’s consideration of economic policies. It is for this reason that China attaches 
more significance to ASEAN than it would be if only the economic factor is considered. 
China’s strategic considerations will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
 
General Trends of China’s Foreign Economic Policy in the 1990s 
Launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China embarked on an era of economic 
reform. Enlivening the domestic economy and opening up to the outside world are two 
basic principles for the reform. The latter has become an ideology in China’s socialist 
construction to some extent. Economic construction is the centre of all state policies. 
Time and again, Deng reiterated that China should keep reform and opening up to the 
world, and that China should concentrate on developing its economy.29 It was believed 
that the old international system established on imperialism, colonialism and hegemony 
was the main impediment to the development of developing countries. Therefore, Deng 
set the principle for China’s foreign policy to be “Tao Guang Yang Hui,” meaning to 
                                                 
29 See Deng, Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping Wen Xuan (Selections of Deng Xiaoping), Volume 3. Beijing: 
Renmin Press, 1993. pp.9-11, 77-79, 232-235. In “Our Grand Goal and Basic Policies”, Deng said the 
policy of reform and opening up is a long-term policy, which would not change in fifty to seventy years. 
(page 79) 
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keep a low profile and preserve energy before taking proactive moves.30 As a result, 
China’s foreign policy behaviours were generally kept at a low profile. As a result, profit 
was the main, if not the single, objective of developing economic relations. With an 
outward oriented economic reform, China achieved rapid growth in foreign trade and 
investment during the Deng era.  
In the post-Deng era, China’s foreign trade and investment policies have followed 
the principle of “opening up to the outside world.” The Chinese government still regards 
the expansion of foreign-related economic activities beneficial and necessary for China’s 
overall development. The government continues to enhance the degree of openness of the 
Chinese economy and to link up China’s domestic market with the global market. 
However, compared to the Deng era, the Chinese authority pays more attention to 
economic security, particularly on stabilizing and balancing economic development. This 
is partly because of various social problems as a result of a decade of economic 
development. Many state owned enterprises went down in the reform process. The 
deepening income inequality and increasing unemployment are sources of potential social 
instability. Part of the blame is put on competition from foreign products and businesses. 
Moreover, economic crises in other parts of the world such as Southeast Asia and Latin 
America served as warnings for Beijing on the fatal risks of opening up the economy. 
With regime survival being the highest goal, Chinese government has started to take a 
gradualist and selective mode for economic liberalization. Social, economic and political 
stability are emphasized instead of simply economic development. 
                                                 
30 Qian, Qichen. Speech on the Conference of Studying Deng Xiaoping Thoughts on Diplomacy. Beijing: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 12, 1995. Online at 
http://www.bupt.edu.cn/news/dangjian/content/d04/dxp/content_1034265.htm. 
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Moreover, it is discernable that China is learning to adapt to the general 
international practices.  The principle of ‘Tao Guang Yang Hui’ has been reassessed in 
the context of China’s rising power in the world. China has started to play a more active 
and responsible role. Upon its accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
China made commitments to bring down its trade barriers. This comprises an important 
basis for its further economic liberalization and reforms of the legal, administrative and 
market systems consistent with international requests. At the same time, it is increasingly 
active in participating in regional cooperations and dialogues in Asia through various 
channels and mechanisms including the APEC, ARF and the ASEAN Plus Three 
Summits.  
With the opening up of China, Sino-ASEAN economic relations grew rapidly, 
especially after the retreat or demise of the communist threat in Southeast Asia and the 
virtual dormancy of the South China Sea dispute. China and ASEAN have stressed the 
importance of each other for their own security and development. As to future economic 
cooperation, optimistic predictions are often heard from both sides. 31  
However, an objective assessment on Sino-ASEAN economic relations is needed 
before analyzing the driving forces behind the developments. It is in this sense that 
ASEAN’s economic significance to China is especially a crucial question. 
 
 
                                                 
31 For example, ASEAN secretary General Rodolfo Severino said ahead of the Agreement of ACFTA: “We 
see that as an opportunity for ASEAN’s exports into China, and at the same time, as China's economy 
grows, we expect China to be investing into ASEAN.” See Maria Ressa, “World’s Largest Free Trade Zone 
Agreed”, CNN, November 6, 2001, available on CNN website www.cnn.com. And, Zhang Yunling, Chair 
of a China-ASEAN expert group to compile a FTA feasibility report for Chinese and ASEAN leaders, said 
“The mutual interests between the two sides will overcome the difficulties looming before the proposed 
ASEAN-China FTA. ASEAN-China FTA Benefits Both Sides.” See China Daily, April 3, 2002. 
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ASEAN’s Status in China’s Foreign Economic Relations 
In the map of China’s foreign economic relations, where does ASEAN stand? 
What are China’s economic policies toward ASEAN? What is ASEAN’s importance to 
China’s economic relations? How is the potential of Sino-ASEAN relations compared to 
China’s economic relations with Japan, EU and USA?  
 
ASEAN’s share in China’s foreign trade 
ASEAN’s proportion is not significant in China’s foreign trade. One important 
indicator is China’s outward exports because it is directly related to China’s benefit from 
its foreign trade and China has regarded exports as an important source for its economic 
growth. ASEAN’s shares in China’s exports from 1998 to 2002 are shown in Table 2.1 in 
comparison with Japan, EU and the US. Take the year of 2000 for example, the year in 
which Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed to establish an ASEAN-China FTA on the 
4th ASEAN Informal Summit in Singapore in November. In 2000, ASEAN only made up 
7% of China’s export volume, far less than 20.9%, 16.7% or 15.3% for the US, Japan and 
EU respectively. ASEAN’s proportions in China’s import and total foreign trade (export 










Table 2.1 Share in export volumes with China (1999-2002) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Japan 16.2% 16.6% 16.7% 16.9% 14.9% 
EU 15.3% 15.5% 15.3% 15.4% 14.8% 
US 20.7% 21.5% 20.9% 20.4% 21.5% 
ASEAN 6.0% 6.3% 7.0% 7.0% 7.2% 
 
Export share = Bilateral export volume / China’s total export volume x 100% 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 1998-2002. From Global Market Information Database. 
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One reason for the relatively low volume of Sino-ASEAN trade may be the tariffs 
on both sides. Trade protectionism has been a common practice by Asian countries in the 
20th century. In the case of China and ASEAN, average tariffs in China are higher than 
average Most Favoured Nations (MFN) rates in the WTO members of ASEAN, 
especially on some major export items of ASEAN such as agricultural products, seafood, 
textile, rubber and chemical products. Some ASEAN member’s high tariff structure 
remains an impediment to China’s market access into many sectors, such as rice, 
motorcycles, alcoholic beverages and meat products.32 
Another reason for the insignificant proportion of Sino-ASEAN trade is that their 
structures of trade commodities are not very complementary. China and most ASEAN 
countries are developing countries, with an advantage in exporting labour-intensive 
products. An analysis of China and ASEAN’s exports shows here that there is a high 
degree of similarity between their export commodities. Table 2.2 shows their respective 
top five major exports. Textile and apparel, which ranks first in China’s top 10 exports, is 
also the second most important export sector for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
Machinery and electrical appliances, which ranks second in China’s top 10 exports, is 






                                                 
32 “Forging Closer ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the Twenty-first Century.” A report submitted by 
ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation, October 2001, p.26.  Online at the official website 
of ASEAN: http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm. 
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Table 2.2 China and ASEAN Top 5 Exports 
Country Top 5 Exports 
China 
Textiles and apparel, Machinery and electrical appliances, Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles, Base metal and metal articles, Footwear 
Indonesia 
Mineral products, Textiles and apparel, Wood and wood articles, Machinery and 
electrical appliances, Antiques and works of art 
Malaysia 
Machinery and electrical appliances, Mineral products, Wood and wood articles, Fats 
and oils, Plastics 
Philippines 
Machinery and electrical appliances, Textiles and apparel, Fats and oils, Prepared 
foodstuffs, Base metal and metal articles 
Singapore 
Machinery and electrical appliances, Mineral products, Chemicals, Base metal and 
metal articles, Optical, precision & musical instruments 
Thailand 
Machinery and electrical appliances, Textiles and apparel, Prepared foodstuffs, Plastics, 
Vegetable products 
Source: China Customs Statistics Yearbook (various issues). 33 
 
Is it natural for the two parties to form a free trade area in the light of their current 
economic patterns? According to classic economic liberalism, the value of a free market 
is that, producers can concentrate on their production of relative comparative advantage 
to get the most benefit. 34 There comes the value of a free trade area: it allows countries 
in the area to concentrate on the production of comparative advantage, to achieve 
economies of scale and to give market access of different products to each other. 
                                                 
33 Tongzon, Jose L. “China’s Accession to the WTO and Its Impact on ASEAN countries.” In The 
Economies of Southeast Asia: Before and After the Crisis, 239-240. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2002. 
34 Refer to David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, London: Dent, 1973.  
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Therefore, for an FTA to have value and to benefit the member countries most, the 
countries should be complementary in their comparative advantages in production. As is 
shown from Table 2.2 above, China and ASEAN have similar structures of exported 
goods—mostly labour-intensive goods. When an FTA is established, there will not be 
much increase in China’s export to ASEAN in the near future if China and ASEAN 
maintain their current economic structures.  
 
ASEAN’s place in China’s foreign direct investment 
In the policy for foreign investors, the Chinese government has classified foreign 
economic activities into four categories: closed, restricted, permitted or encouraged.35 
“Encouraged” category includes technology-intensive industries, energy and raw material 
industries, telecommunication and transportation, new agricultural technologies, new 
technology for environment protection, and very importantly those which can adequately 
exploit the resources and manpower advantages of Midwest China and which are in line 
with the state’s sector policies. “Restricted” category includes products China can 
produce competitively and in sufficient amount to meet domestic demand. The aim of 
such policies is to avoid relatively less efficient economic activities from crowding out 
more efficient ones. It has been observed that among the ASEAN countries, Thai 
investors tended to invest in human capital intensive and technology intensive industries, 
while Indonesians, Malaysians and Filipinos invested in unskilled labour intensive 
manufactures.36 Singapore was one of the first Southeast Asian countries to enter China 
                                                 
35 Woo, Tun-oy. ‘Foreign Trade and Investment Policies in the Post-Deng Era.’ In China in the Post-Deng 
Era, edited by Joseph Y. S. Cheng. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998. 
36 Hao, Yuan and Guofang Huan, eds. The Chinese View of the World, 217. New York: Pantheon Books, 
1989. 
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when the latter first opened up to foreign investment in the late 1970s. By the end of 2001, 
Singapore was the fifth largest investor in China, with a cumulative utilized investment of 
US$ 18.6 billion.37 Using the links between the ethnic Chinese, the investments went 
mainly to small businesses in Guangdong and Fujian. Singapore investments in China are 
concentrated in manufacturing (62.6%) and real estate and construction (17.8%). 38 
However, these happen to be the sectors that China can produce competitively and so 
should be “restricted” according to China’s regulative policies. In 2002, ASEAN-5 made 
up 6.07% of China’s inward flow of utilized foreign investments, smaller than that of EU 
(7.03%), Japan (7.94%), or the US (10.28%).39 By the year 2002, Singapore was the fifth 
biggest investor in China, making up 4.79%, smaller than the US (8.9%) or Japan 
(8.11%). The next biggest Southeast investor is Malaysia, with a share of only 0.63%.40 
EU made up 11.11, 11, and 8.92 percent in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively.41 
China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) is very small compared to 
inward FDI. The Chinese government has recently encouraged Chinese companies to 
invest in engineering and construction projects.42 The industries that attracted Chinese 
investments include metallurgy and minerals, petro-chemicals and chemicals. This is 
partly out of the consideration for future resource security considering China’s fast 
growing demands of fuel, minerals and other resources, and the unstable political 
                                                 
37 Pangestu, Mari and Sudarshan Gooptu. “New Regionalism: Options for China and East Asia.” In East 
Asia Integrates: A Trade Policy Agenda for Shared Growth, edited by Kathie Krumm and Homi Kharas, 94. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003. 
38 Chia, Siow Yue. “ASEAN-China Free Trade Area,” a paper presented at the 7th Asian Economic Panel 
Meeting in Hong Kong in April 2004. Online at: http://www.hiebs.hku.hk/aep/Chia.pdf. 
39 Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM). Online at MOFCOM official website: 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200307/20030700107472_1.xml 
40 Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM). Online at MOFCOM official website: 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200307/20030700112770_1.xml 
41 Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM). Online at MOFCOM official website: 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200307/20030700112768_1.xml 
42 Far East Economic Review, March 28, 2002. 
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situations in the Middle-East countries. Geographic affinity and abundance in some 
natural resources are ASEAN’s advantages in attracting China’s FDI. However, because 
of the sluggish growth of the group’s economy since the Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN 
generally remains a less attractive destination for Chinese investment than Latin America, 
the United States, or Europe.43 Most of the Chinese investments in ASEAN have been 
undertaken by state-owned companies. The private sectors are not yet strong enough for 
international competition, and some investors in the Indochinese countries were 
disappointed by the situations there.44 Therefore, Sino-ASEAN investment relations are 
largely influenced by state policies and state-to-state relations. 
In China’s choices of economic cooperation partners, ASEAN indeed has an 
advantage in geographical affinity. But Japan and South Korea also have such an 
advantage. Moreover, they have different economic structures from China. If the purpose 
of an FTA agreement is simply to increase trade and investment, China would be better 
off signing free trade agreements with Japan or South Korea first, but not ASEAN.  
Japan and South Korea have started FTA talks but China is not active in 
participating in it presently although they are all Northeast Asian economies and their 
economic interactions with China have been quite active for the past decade. The reason 
for the different developments in their relations is partly political, namely, that there are 
still deep historic resentments between China and Japan. And a major impediment to the 
realization of an East Asia FTA is the competition between China and Japan for regional 
leadership. Although Japanese officials stressed that Japan was not interested in 
                                                 
43 Pangestu, Mari and Sudarshan Gooptu. ‘New Regionalism: Options for China and East Asia.’ In East 
Asia Integrates, edited by Kathie Krumm and Homi Kharas, 94. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003. 
44 Baviera, Aileen S. P. “The Political Economy of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia”. In China’s 
Economic Growth and the ASEAN, edited by Ellen H. Palanca, 264. Philippine APEC Study Center 
Network and Philippine Institute for Development Studies: 2001. 
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competing with China for political influence in the region, Japan tries to maintain its 
leadership in the East Asian economy. “We have no intention of competing with the 
Chinese. Since we have different values and are at a different stage of economic 
development, clearly there is a different role for Japan in the region, but Japan would be 
only too happy to provide more 'regional leadership' if ASEAN nations wanted it,” said 
one Japanese Foreign Affairs official.45 South Korea and China have both geographic 
affinity and complementary economic structures. South Korea has advantages in capital-
intensive and technology-intensive goods, while China has an advantage in labour-
intensive goods. South Korea is afraid that China’s agricultural and textile products will 
compete with domestic products. China, on the other hand, is also concerned with 
possible impact brought by Korean heavy industrial products. 
Another reason for the slow development between China and its Northeast Asian 
neighbours may well be the reluctance of the Chinese government to open its market to 
more advanced economies at the present stage. If the advanced economies are reluctant to 
open its agricultural and labour-intensive product markets, it is difficult to reach 
consensus with China unless the Chinese government has a strong political will. 
 
Generally speaking, ASEAN does not occupy a big portion in China’s economic 
relations, nor does it have the natural advantages in forming an FTA with China when 
compared to some other countries. This is because it does not have a complementary 
economic structure with China and it cannot increase China’s export or FDI extensively. 
Without substantial adjustment to their economic structures, ASEAN does not comprise a 
                                                 
45 “Japan Set to Strengthen ASEAN Ties.” The Straits Times, November 20, 2003. Online from LexisNexis 
Academic Database. 
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natural FTA partner with China. The relationship between China and ASEAN would not 
grow very fast if unless were led by strong policy initiatives from the government. 
Therefore a look at the actual growth in Sino-ASEAN economic relations since the 1990s 
is needed to assess whether deliberate government policy initiatives have indeed existed. 
 
Fast Growth of Sino-ASEAN Economic Relations since the Late 1990s 
In the early 1990s, ASEAN was not a major source of foreign investment for 
China. In 1990, investment value from the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand) shared only 1.7%, much smaller than the US, Hong Kong, 
Japan or Europe. In the 1990s, ASEAN achieved great growth in its share of China’s total 
foreign investment inflows. Singapore’s investment in the infrastructure of Suzhou 
Industrial Park is now seen as the trademark of Singapore investment in China. As is 
shown in Table 2.3, from 1990 to 2002, the share of ASEAN-5 increased from 1.7% to 
8.12%. In contrast, Japan’s share reduced significantly from 14.44% to 7.37%. The US 
share also decreased from 13.08% to 10.46%.  
 
Table 2.3 Share of Foreign Investments in China by Country of Origin (Utilized Amount) 
 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
ASEAN-5 46 1.7 3.5 7.5 8.12 8.12
US 13.08 7.5 8.25 10.46 10.46
Europe 4.23 2.44 6.56 11.11 11.11
Japan 14.44 4.81 8.82 7.37 7.37
                 Source: Ministry of Commerce of China.47 
                                                 
46 ASEAN-5 include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
47 Online at the official website of MOFCOM: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/waimaotongji.shtml.  
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Although ASEAN’s trade volume does not occupy a considerable portion in 
China’s trade, their bilateral trade has been growing fast since the late 1990s despite their 
similar economic structures. As is shown in Figure 2.2, China’s exports to ASEAN 
increased from 4150.7 US $mn in 1990 to 23574.0 US $mn in 2002.48 (For yearly figures 
of China’s exports to ASEAN, EU, Japan and US, see Appendix: Table 6.) 
 




















Exports (fob) to Japan  (US$ mn)
Exports (fob) to EU (US$ mn)
Exports (fob) to USA (US$ mn)
Exports (fob) to ASEAN (US$mn)
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Online from the Global Market Database. 
 
Notably, the share of ASEAN in China’s exports has been growing very fast since 
the late 1990s (See Appendix: Table 7.) As is shown in Figure 3, ASEAN’s growth of 
                                                 
48 Because of the availability of data and because of the timing when ACFTA was signed, the year 2002 is 
used in this study as the latest year for analyzing China’s policy decision on ACFTA and China-ASEAN 
economic relations. 
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share in China’s export volume is faster than that of Japan and EU since 1999. In 1999 
and 2000, it even surpassed the US as the fastest growing destination of China’s exports. 
 















Growth rate of share ASEAN Growth rate of share Japan Growth rate of share EU Growth rate of share US
Source: calculated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 49 (also see Appendix: Table 7). 
 
Do China’s increasing exports correspond with ASEAN’s increasing imports, and 
vice versa? By calculating the growth rates of the commodities in China’s exports, 
China’s fastest increasing exports from 1999 to 2001 are found out The same calculations 
are done to China’s imports, ASEAN’s exports and ASEAN’s imports. (See Appendix: 
Table 8, 9, 10 and 11.) When we compare the composition of China’s fastest increasing 
exports with that of ASEAN’s fastest increasing imports, some overlaps can be found 
(see Table 2.4). In 1999, the overlapped commodities included crude materials (excluding 
                                                 
49 Calculated from export data from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Global Market Database.  
    Growth of share in Year X = share in Year X / share in Year (X-1) – 1. 
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fuels) and miscellaneous manufactured goods. In 2000, the overlapped commodities were 
mineral fuels, machinery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured 
goods. In 2001, they included beverages and tobacco. 
In a similar way, the composition of China’s fastest increasing imports and 
ASEAN’s fastest increasing exports are compared from 1999 to 2001 (see Table 2.5). In 
1999, the overlapped commodities were chemicals, mineral fuels and other goods. In 
2000: mineral fuels, crude materials excluding fuels, machinery and transport equipment. 
In 2001 beverages and tobacco were the common fastest growing commodities. 
Table 2.4 China’s fastest increasing export commodities and ASEAN’s fastest increasing import 
commodities 
 1999 2000 2001 
China’s exports machinery and transport 
equipment, crude 





other goods, mineral 











ASEAN’s imports other goods, mineral 





machinery and transport 
equipment, crude 




other goods, beverages 
and tobacco 
Source: calculated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Online from Global Market Database. 
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Table 2.5 China’s fastest increasing import commodities and ASEAN’s fastest increasing export 
commodities 
 1999 2000 2001 
China’s imports other goods, mineral 
fuels, machinery and 
transport equipment, 
chemicals, crude 
materials exc. fuels 
mineral fuels, beverages 
and tobacco, crude 
materials exc. fuels, 
machinery and transport 




machinery and transport 
equipment, beverages 
and tobacco, crude 
materials exc. fuels, 
chemicals 
ASEAN’s exports other goods, chemicals, 





machinery and transport 
equipment, crude 




other goods, beverages 
and tobacco 
Source: calculated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Online from Global Market Database. 
 
The coherences between China’s and ASEAN’s trade commodities gives an 
indication that China gives priority to goods that can be traded with ASEAN. Some 
Chinese officials hold that by granting earlier tariff concessions, or “early harvest 
packages” as it is called, China is now giving ASEAN time to improve its industrial 
technology before the FTA is fully realized. Strong government initiatives of cooperation 
are evident on both sides in promoting Sino-ASEAN bilateral relations. Early fruits of 
cooperation have already grown since late 1990s as can be seen in Sino-ASEAN trade 
growth. The result of this strengthened trade interaction is more entanglement of interests 
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of China and ASEAN, both economic and strategic. Both parties are becoming 
increasingly more important for the other’s economic relations and overall development.  
 
Summary 
It is evident that ASEAN does not occupy a significant proportion in China’s 
external trade or investment, nor is it particularly complementary with China in economic 
structures. But relations between China and ASEAN have been developing rapidly 
especially since late 1990s. This contradiction indicates a strong initiative from the 
governments. The Chinese government’s initiative is rooted in its selective policy of 
developing cooperative foreign economic relations based on strategic consideration. In 
other words, in economic terms, ASEAN is not the most important to China. But in 
China’s foreign economic cooperations, it enjoys strategic priority. 
In general, ASEAN does not occupy a prominent portion in China’s trade or 
investment relations. However, Sino-ASEAN economic relations developed very fast 
since the late 1990s. There is clearly a strong initiative of the Chinese government to 
develop close ties with ASEAN. Here comes a question: why does the Chinese 
government have this strong initiative with ASEAN despite the latter’s small portion and 
similar economic structures? 
The next chapter will analyze the strategic concerns of the Chinese government in 
foreign economic policymaking which have resulted in China’s policy to cooperate with 
the ASEAN. 
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Chapter 3 China’s Foreign Economic Policy Strategy: Case Studies of China’s 
Participation in International Economic Arrangements 
 
China has displayed various attitudes and behaviours towards regional and 
international economic arrangements, ranging from opposition, participation and 
enthusiastic support. Is there a constant theme in China’s foreign economic policymaking, 
instead of idiosyncratic policy responses? What is China’s strategy when it considers its 
policy on these economic arrangements? Why does China give more priority to economic 
cooperation with ASEAN among other countries? 
This chapter will begin with an introduction of the hypothesis for analyzing 
China’s foreign economic policy consideration. Then the hypothesis will be tested by 
several case studies of China’s policies on regional economic cooperation proposals, as 
well as its participation in regional and international economic arrangements. China’s 
considerations on Asian economic arrangements undoubtedly involved the factor of 
ASEAN. The next chapter will then test whether the hypothesis is supported by the case 
of ACFTA.  
 
Respect and Manageability in China’s Foreign Economic Policymaking 
China has in many occasions claimed to be a responsible member of the 
international community. Seeking the image of a responsible actor is essentially aimed at 
gaining international respect. It tries to diminish the worry that a rising China will pose a 
threat to other countries. Instead, it stresses its determination and ability to contribute to 
international peace and development. By pursuing international respect, China expects to 
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raise its international status, to maintain sovereignty on several key issues and to achieve 
cooperation from other countries. Having endured isolation from the international society 
for a long time since the establishment of PRC and influenced by issues such as the 
Tiananmen Incident, China longs for a friendly and respectful international environment 
for its economic development. Having been the Middle Kingdom50 with a dominant 
power in Asia, China probably still feels entitled to a central role in the region. At the 
moment, China is taking its chances to resume its stance as a big power in the region, if 
not in the world. 
Respect is not the only aim that China tries to achieve in the international 
arrangements. Maintaining manageability over its own policies and over the collective 
international policies is another crucial aim. Manageability means autonomy in its own 
policies and a certain degree of control of regional policies. This is especially important 
in the era of China’s accelerating integration into the world economy. During the Cold 
War, although China did not clearly express anxiety over losing manageability over its 
domestic and foreign policies, it argued that international organizations were instruments 
of the West to exert their rule over the developing countries. In the post-Cold War era, 
China’s activeness has obviously increased but it still does not have enough confidence. 
It is discernible from China’s foreign policy behaviours that maintaining manageability 
over its own policy decisions is a precondition for entering international arrangements. 
However, with China’s economic growth and general enhancement of state power, China 
gradually seeks to get more manageability over the international collective decisions. 
                                                 
50 “Middle Kingdom” is the literal meaning of Zhong Guo [China], which suggests a mentality of ancient 
Chinese to regard China as centre of the region.  
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It is hypothesized here that respect and manageability are the two central 
concerns in China’s calculation when it decides policies on regional and international 
economic arrangements. In other words, China tries to gain international respect and to 
manage its own policies as well as the regional collective policies. The more respect and 
the more managing power China can get, the more support it gives to an international 
economic arrangement. China pursued economic cooperation with ASEAN because it 
suits the two objectives well. 
How does China measure whether participation in an international economic 
arrangement can enhance its image as a responsible actor? In Chinese perspective, 
international respect comes from either of the following sources: 
First, China is fulfilling international obligations and advocating international 
norms; 
Second, China is willing and able to help other countries to overcome problems 
and achieve development; 
Third, China plays an important role in promoting regional economic cooperation; 
Finally, the proposed international arrangement would most likely be successfully 
realized and be influential in the international society. 
The above four sources combines to form the utility of an international 
arrangement for China to gain international respect. Sometimes the four sources cannot 
be achieved at the same time. For instance, exclusive regional trade area is in conflict 
with the international principle of economic liberalization. However, economic 
regionalism and globalism can be compatible when regionalism functions as a building 
block for global free trade. Sometimes one source seem especially important to China 
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depending on circumstances. When it gave commitment to global free trade, it might shift 
to show special dedication to regional development and cooperation. It is impossible to 
evaluate which source of international respect bears more weight for China in general, 
but the utilities of international arrangements may differ in how much respect it can bring 
to China. Among the utilities, it seems that the prospect of success of an arrangement has 
prominent importance for China. 
China would not be satisfied with a respectable arrangement which is beyond its 
manageability or even endangers its manageability over the national policies. How does 
China measure whether it will maintain manageability over its own and the collective 
policy decisions after entering an international arrangement? Three measurements are in 
consideration: 
First, bilateral arrangements are easier to manage than multilateral ones; 
Second, voluntary implementation is more manageable than compulsory 
implementation; 
Third, the more power to prevail over others, or prevailing power, China has 
among the group members, the more manageability China has in the decision making of 
the international arrangement.  
The following part of this chapter will analyze several cases of China’s policy on 
economic cooperation. In each case, the utilities of that economic arrangement are 
analyzed according to the criteria suggested above. China’s policy in each case is also 
studied. Relating the utilities and policies, this part inquires whether respect and 
manageability are the two central aims of China’s foreign economic policy.  
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Case Studies of China’s Policies on International Economic Cooperations 
International economic arrangements take various forms. Some are part of a 
process that changes constantly, while some are institutions with a relatively more stable 
and substantial form. Some have achieved development over years while others were just 
infertile proposals. When analyzing China’s policy over these arrangements, it is 
necessary to categorize the cases into two groups according to the timing of China’s 
decision making. The first category includes the economic arrangements that were only 
proposals for China to consider. The second category includes the international 
arrangements that were already in existence at the time for China to make policy 
decisions.  
In this study, cases of China’s participation in the regional and international 
economic arrangements will be studied to test the hypothesis. Major initiatives of East 
Asian economic regionalism include: the East Asian Economic Grouping / Caucus 
(EAEG / EAEC), the Asian Monetary Fund, the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) 
and the ASEAN+3 (APT) cooperation. The major economic arrangement in the Asia-
Pacific region is APEC. The international economic arrangement included in this study is 
the WTO.51 
 
Proposals of International Economic Arrangements 
The first category are the economic arrangements that were proposals at the time 
for China to consider. They include the East Asian Economic Grouping / Caucus (EAEG 
                                                 
51 There are some other regional and international economic institutions and initiatives, such as Asia Bond 
Fund (ABF), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Executives Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central 
Banks (EMEAP), IMF and World Bank. However, they are beyond the scope of this paper because of 
limitation of data and resources. 
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/ EAEC), AMF, and EAFTA. China’s policy making over regional and international 
policy proposals is based on its predictions of the utilities of the proposed arrangement 
for China and China’s possible role in it if it is formed. 
 
EAEG / EAEC  
The idea of EAEG came from Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed 
in 1990. It was an ambitious initiative aimed at creating an East Asian trade grouping to 
counter the “controlled international marketing system” of the Western countries, “a 
formal grouping intended to facilitate consultation and consensus prior to negotiating 
with Europe or America or in a multilateral forum such as the GATT”.52 The intended 
members included the ASEAN countries (ASEAN-5: Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and 
the Indo-China countries. Knowing that he would get China’s backing, Mahathir 
proposed the EAEG when Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Kuala Lumpur and received 
support from China.53 China’s supportive attitude was natural because of the following 
reasons: the EAEG was initiated by Malaysia; it was intended to form a louder East 
Asian voice to challenge the dominance of the Western countries in the world trade 
system; it was aimed at promoting free trade instead of trade protectionism; and, its 
decision making was meant to be consultative. 
The EAEG was almost immediately renamed EAEC by ASEAN in response to 
concerns that it would become a regional trade bloc and make APEC redundant. The 
                                                 
52 Speech by Dr Mahathir Mohamed on 4 March 1991, at the Conference on “The ASEAN Countries and 
the World Economy: Challenge of Change,” organized by the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies—Asia Society in Bali, 3-5 March 1991. Quoted by Linda Low, “The East Asian Economic 
Grouping.” The Pacific Review, Vol.4, No.4 (1991), p.375. 
53 Low, Linda. “The East Asian Economic Grouping.” The Pacific Review, Vol.4, No.4 (1991), p.375. 
 44
opposition was from excluded Asia-Pacific countries such as Australia, New Zealand and 
the US. The positions of South Korea and Japan were ambiguous because of the pressure 
from the US. 54 At the June 1993 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, it was proposed 
that EAEG should become a caucus within the APEC framework. China continued to 
express support for this initiative, but made no substantial diplomatic effort to realize it. 
After all, it was not proposed by China, and it has become subordinate to APEC. 
Although EAEG or EAEC in essence may not comply with WTO’s principle of 
global trade liberalization, it was the precursor of East Asian regionalism. If it had been 
established, the founding countries would certainly be great contributors to East Asian 
regional cooperation. It came after setbacks to the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and could challenge the US hegemony with a 
louder voice of East Asia.  
Consultation and consensus were suggested to be the principles of decision 
making. China would not be forced to carry out domestic reforms or tariff reduction. It 
seemed that China could win respect from East Asian countries without losing 
manageability of policy decisions. However, it was a multilateral arrangement and the 
distribution of power in the decision making was not clear yet. It was obvious that China 
could not defeat Japan’s prevailing power at the time of proposal because China’s 
economic power was far behind that of Japan and China had just started market reform 
with an uncertain potential. Therefore, it was not certain how much prevailing power 
China would have on other countries within the proposed EAEG. China was putting most 
of its energy in domestic reform and national development. It did not have enough 
                                                 
54 Higgott, Richard and Richard Stubbs. “Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: 
APEC Versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific.” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2, Issue 3 
(Summer 1995). 
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confidence or enthusiasm for regional economic arrangements. Moreover, because the 
initiative of EAEG did not come into substantial shape, it would not be very helpful for 
China to increase its influence in the region. Therefore, China had in many occasions 
expressed its support for EAEC,55 but did not pay much effort to propel its realization. 
 
AMF  
Another ambitious initiative of East Asian regionalism was proposed by Japan to 
establish an AMF. The initial suggestion came from Japan and Taiwan in 1997 before the 
start of the Asian Financial Crisis. The idea was to radically deepen the monetary 
cooperation among the countries within the region through institutionalization. The AMF 
idea was to provide loans to overcome crises with softer conditionalities than those of the 
IMF. At the request of Japan, a meeting among twelve Asian nations was held during the 
IMF/World Bank annual meeting to discuss the details of the proposed AMF. It failed 
because of US opposition that it might weaken the existing international financial 
architecture under IMF and weaken IMF authority. It failed also because the regional 
members held significantly different opinions.56  Less widely known is that the AMF 
proposal was also opposed by China.57  
Participation in AMF could actually increase China’s credit in several aspects. It 
would strengthen regional monetary cooperation and Asian cohesiveness. It would 
provide safeguard measures to Asian countries against international financial flux. It had 
                                                 
55 Gu, Zhenqiu. “ASEAN Ready for Closer Cooperation.” Beijing Review, 5-11 August 1991, p.16. 
56 The twelve countries were: South Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia, Singapore and New Zealand. See Wang Yunjong.  “The Asian Financial Crisis and Its 
Aftermath: Do We Need a Regional Financial Arrangement?” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 17, Issue 2 
(2000). 
57 Ravenhill, John. “A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism.” International Relations of 
the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2 (2002), p.186. 
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softer conditionality than IMF and therefore more ready to help countries in crisis. 
Finally, it could challenge US hegemony in world economy. However, China did not 
choose to play the role of a responsible regional actor to get more respect. One 
explanation may be related to Taiwan. Because AMF was proposed by Japan and Taiwan, 
acceptance to this idea might facilitate Taiwan’s involvement in regional affairs. That 
would damage the international respect for China’s sovereignty to some extent. Another 
explanation was China’s prediction that the AMF proposal would not be approved by the 
US. The nature of the proposed AMF was clearly one that stressed regional independence 
from the IMF system, a Japan-led Asian group against the US-led international monetary 
mechanism. Considering US world hegemonic policy and Japan’s dependency on US in 
many aspects, it was certainly doubtful that AMF could be successfully established. 
Chinese policymakers were cautious that they did not give support to an unworkable 
proposal with the risk of infuriating the US. 
More importantly, China had concerns of losing manageability. It was very likely 
that the mechanism of AMF would be similar to IMF, and so decision would most likely 
depend on the percentage of fund as in IMF. When Japan proposed the idea, it offered to 
provide half of the initial fund supply.58 AMF would apparently be dominated by Japan. 
This multilateral financial arrangement would be legally binding and so contribution to a 
financial assistance project would be compulsory. China would have to put some of its 
reserve at stake. China did not want to fall far behind Japan in the competition for East 
Asian leadership. China was also much worried that it would not be able to manage AMF 
policy decisions and pay great amount of money as a creditor. A Chinese expert in the 
                                                 
58 Wang, Yunjong. “The Asian Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath: Do We Need a Regional Financial 
Arrangement?” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 17, Issue 2 (2000). 
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Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM), who participated in the policy decision 
process, explained that Chinese representatives did not accept Japan’s proposal because 
China did not have enough economic capability or information; besides, they did not 
know the opinion of the US over that proposal yet.59  
 
EAFTA 
On the second ASEAN+3 Summit in Hanoi in 1998, Korean president Kim Dae-
jung proposed to set up an East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) to study the prospects of 
East Asian cooperation. The EAVG Report was tabled at the fifth Summit in Brunei in 
2001. The suggestions of the Report included: to establish an EAFTA; to transform 
ASEAN+3 Summit into an East Asian Summit; and to strengthen comprehensive 
cooperation aimed at the establishment of an East Asian Community.60 However, these 
suggestions were considered premature by the leaders. Chinese leadership also 
considered it ‘premature and not feasible’.61  
One of the reasons was that China considered it still very difficult for the three 
Northeast Asian countries to set up an FTA among them. Japan and South Korea were 
worried about China’s cheap textiles and agricultural products, while China was 
concerned with competition from heavy chemical products from Japan and South Korea. 
62  However, since the EAFTA was actually proposed by Kim, Korea should not be 
considered unprepared despite the trade protectionism at home. Therefore, when China 
                                                 
59 Personal interview with Xu Changwen, MOFCOM, 19 February 2004. 
60 “Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress.” Report by the East 
Asian Vision Group. Online at the official website of ASEAN: 
http://www.aseansec.org/pdf/east_asia_vision.pdf, April 9, 2004. 
61 Personal interview with one Chinese expert who was a member of the EAVG, February 17, 2004. 
62 Ibid. 
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referred to the EAFTA proposal as being premature, China was actually considering the 
power distribution between China and Japan in the proposed EAFTA. The EAFTA 
proposal did not suggest ASEAN leadership or developing on the basis of AFTA. 
Judging from economic powers, Japan still holds economic leadership in East Asia in 
terms of the amount of trade, investment and financial aid. Korea might also be 
considered an ally of Japan in institutional bargaining because it has more similar 
economic and political systems with Japan than with other countries. Historic resentment, 
territorial disputes and leadership competition still stand in the way of Sino-Japan 
cooperation. Therefore, EAFTA did not have an optimistic future from the Chinese 
perspective. Without much hope for its success in the near future, China did not think it 
can win much respect for it even if it accepted South Korea’s proposal of EAFTA. 
In general, being party to EAFTA would win China respect for being cooperative 
in East Asian regionalism, but not as the initiator. However, the economic and political 
obstacles are still too high for EAFTA to become a reality in the near future. China did 
not think it worth much effort at that moment. Moreover, if it were created, China would 
have to acquiesce to Japan’s leadership in East Asian economic cooperation. Moreover, it 
would probably cause China to surrender some of its economic sovereignty to this 
regional arrangement. China might lose manageability over its pace of trade liberalization, 
as well as the developments of East Asian regional cooperation. As a result, it suggested 
that the East Asian Study Group to continue exploring “the long-term goals of regional 
cooperation that conform to East Asian realities.”63 
                                                 
63 Zhu Rongji. “Strengthening East Asian Cooperation and Promoting Common Development.” Statement 
at 5th ASEAN Plus Three Summit, Hanoi, November 5, 2001, online at the official website of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of China: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t25044.htm. 
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As a summary to the above analysis on regional economic cooperation proposals 
and China’s policies towards them, seven criteria are used to assess the perceived utilities 
of the arrangements for China as in the following table (Table 3.1). The former four 
criteria are useful for China in gaining international respect, and the latter three in 
maintaining manageability over its national and regional policies. 
 International principle: whether it is advocating international principles, such as 
the global free trade; 
 Help others: whether it is aimed at helping other countries; 
 Promote regionalism: whether it is very helpful for promoting East Asian 
regionalism; 
 Success & Influence: whether it will achieve a large degree of development and 
international influence; 
 Bilateral / multilateral: whether it is bilateral or multilateral; 
 Voluntary / Compulsory: whether it depends on voluntary or compulsory 
implementation; 
 Decision making: How much prevailing power China can have in the decision 







Table 3.1 Perceived utilities of proposed regional economic arrangements for China 




















no no yes no multilateral voluntary unknown keep a 
low 
profile 
AMF no yes yes no multilateral compulsory by quota oppose 
EAFTA no no yes no multilateral compulsory uncertain oppose 
 
China’s policies over the proposals of international economic cooperations 
together with their perceived utilities and characteristics are summarized in the table 
above. It can be inferred from the several cases that China’s consideration on the 
proposals of international economic arrangements is based on its predictions over the 
utilities of the proposed arrangement for China and China’s possible role in it if it were 
formed. The most important utility of the proposed arrangement is how much respect 
China can gain from it. It is the same with all the proposals that if the proposal is 
accepted, China will be one of the founding members and will be respected if the 
arrangement is based on goodwill to promote regional cooperation and economic 
liberalization. Some arrangements were not expected by China to have an optimistic 
future, hence not very useful to enhance international respect for China even if China 
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took part in it, as in the cases of EAEG and EAFTA, although they might form a strong 
East Asian voice against the US dominance in the region.  
Another central concern of China about the proposals is how much manageability 
China can maintain on its national policy and on the arrangement if it is realized. If it has 
a legally binding nature and has some limitation over the state policies of the member 
countries, China will be very cautious about the possible arrangement and the power 
distribution among the proposed members as in the cases of EAFTA and AMF. If it will 
possibly increase the risk of China’s economic policies being controlled by other 
countries, China is not willing to support its formation. If China does not expect to have a 
prevailing power over the international collective policies, it will try to block the 
realization of the proposed arrangement. Apparently, refusal on regional cooperation 
proposals is considered by China to cost less than losing manageability over its economic 
policies. Refusal is one plausible choice for China because Asian diplomacy is usually 
informal, indirect and the institutional developments in Asia are still at a very primitive 
stage. It will not cause much international defiance if China is not very supportive. 
Moreover, it can be compensated by supporting or even initiating other arrangements that 
are considered to be more beneficial for China. That is, the proposed arrangements 
should be able to increase China’s international respect while it should assure China of its 






Existing International Economic Arrangements 
The second category of international economic arrangements are the ones that 
were already in existence at the time for China to make policy decisions. China’s 
policymaking over the existing international economic arrangements involves evaluation 
of the current situations of the arrangement, evaluation of its utilities for China, 
predictions of its future developments, and the perceived role of China within it. Because 
arrangements in this category have achieved some degree of success and international 
influence, China cannot block their formation but can only choose to join or not. If the 
institution has achieved some success and international influence, China usually cannot 
afford to be an outsider. When China has to join, it just decides to participate actively or 
passively. Existing regional and international arrangements include the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI), the ASEAN+3, APEC and WTO. 
 
CMI 
China’s stance changed over another arrangement of regional monetary 
cooperation—CMI. Since the Asian Financial Crisis, there have been strong calls in the 
region for stronger financial cooperation. This is partly because countries which suffered 
from the Crisis were disappointed with IMF and APEC that they did not provide 
appropriate assistance to stop the crisis. Driven by the strong initiatives, a regional 
approach to financial crisis management was relaunched at the Chiang Mai meeting of 
the finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries in 2000. The proposal of an ASEAN 
Plus Three swap arrangement actually originated in the Fourth ASEAN Finance 
Ministers Meeting, held in Brunei in March 2000. Out of the CMI, the governments of 
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the thirteen East Asian countries agreed to pool together their hard currency resources to 
create a network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreements.  
As far as China is concerned, participation in the CMI can increase respect for 
China as a responsible member of the region to prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis. 
As a matter of fact, China had expressed support for East Asian regional cooperation 
since the Crisis, including strengthening financial cooperation. During the Crisis, China 
extended unprecedented substantial financial assistance to Thailand and Indonesia; 
pledged not to devalue the Chinese currency RMB, and promised to address problems of 
financial stability in concert with ASEAN. It tried to blame Japan for not being 
responsible enough for stopping the crisis. Even though China’s financial aid to 
Southeast Asia was much smaller than Japan, it won much more fame for its generosity 
and commitment to its neighbours.  
In December 1998 at the ASEAN summit meeting in Hanoi, China announced a 
proposal for regular discussions among deputy finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 
members, thereby indicating China’s interest in being an active participant in efforts to 
build a new regional financial institution. Whether or not such rhetoric was China’s 
strategic preparation in anticipation of the occurrence of East Asian monetary 
cooperation, the CMI did not fall out of China’s blueprint for East Asian regionalism. 
China can claim to have played a crucial role in the formation of the CMI and 
development of East Asian monetary regionalism.  
The CMI had a brighter future than the AMF for two reasons. Firstly, it was 
established after the Asian Financial Crisis when calls for regional financial cooperation 
were prevalent in Asia. Secondly, the CMI was put under the umbrella of the IMF, 
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particularly in a context where both the US and the Fund were displaying greater 
sensitivities to East Asian concerns than they had before 1997.64  
Because the CMI takes the form of a number of bilateral agreements rather than a 
multilateral agreement, China has manageability over its own negotiations and the policy 
decisions. It can choose partners according to their economic power and their relations 
with China. It can carefully negotiate the bilateral agreements without being imposed by 
a third party or organization of international obligations. It can choose not to accept 
policy suggestions that may endanger China’s financial soundness. China does not have 
the risk of losing manageability of its own financial system. It was initiated at the 
ASEAN meetings, and therefore does not clearly imply Japan’s leading role.  
In summary, because the CMI is beneficial to China’s image as a respectable 
member in the East Asian regionalism and at the same time does not render China’s 
manageability over its own policies at risk, China has participated in it fairly actively. 
China has agreed to five swap arrangements with Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia 
and Philippines respectively.65 Having said this, China’s financial capability is still far 
behind Japan’s, and therefore China cannot be the leader of regional financial 
cooperation at the current stage. If the bilateral arrangement transforms into a multilateral 
one like AMF, China will not be in an advantageous position to maintain manageability 
over the policy decisions. As a result, China is not eager to propel further development of 
the CMI towards a regional multilateral arrangement. 
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ASEAN+3 
ASEAN+3 occurred in the form of an informal gathering during the 1997 
ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Beijing has repeatedly expressed support 
for “a still more united, stable and prosperous ASEAN” as well as for ASEAN to play a 
bigger role in both regional and international affairs.66 At the Fifth ASEAN+3 Summit in 
Brunei in 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed enhancing policy coordination 
within the 10+3 framework while giving support to ASEAN's integration process.67  
China has reiterated its support for ASEAN’s playing “a leading role” within the 
ARF, and has made it clear that it wants ASEAN to remain a key player in ASEAN+3 
cooperation. 68  China’s position is understandable because it has been interested in 
building economic ties with Southeast Asia since the early 1990s. China’s support is also 
appreciated by ASEAN because ASEAN tries to be the coordinating leader and hub of 
the Asian economic relations. Essentially, ASEAN needs external support to prevent 
itself from being marginalized in regional multilateral cooperation. By playing the role of 
the most active supporter for ASEAN’s leading role in the region, China can obtain 
respect from ASEAN. Moreover, China prefers leadership of ASEAN to that of than 
Japan because China has more manageability over Sino-ASEAN economic relations than 
Sino-Japan economic relations. With its influence on ASEAN, China would have more 
manageability over the regional issues in ASEAN+3. 
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ASEAN+3 seems a transformed version of EAEC and EAFTA, but its difference 
from the latter two is crucial. EAEC and EAFTA were ambitious plans for an East Asian 
group with no indication of leadership. Because the two plans were economic groups, the 
leadership would largely belong to Japan. ASEAN+3 is instead a regional dialogue or a 
process, which clearly defines a leading role of ASEAN in coordinating and promoting 
East Asian regional cooperation. Since China has always expressed its support for 
ASEAN’s leading role in East Asian integration process, the development of ASEAN+3 
is consistent with China’s preference for the structure of regional cooperation. Due 
respect would be given by ASEAN to China’s support and promotion of regional 
cooperation. At the same time, since initiatives would mostly come from ASEAN, and 
regional bargaining would be coordinated by ASEAN, China believes that the policies 
would not be compulsory or radical. It does not require Northeast Asian institutional 
building. Instead policy coordination is carried out among three sets of ASEAN+1 
cooperations. Thus it will not cause China to negotiate cooperative measures directly 




China adopted the national strategy of opening up to the world economy in 1978, 
but did not make her debut in regional or international trade organizations until it joined 
APEC in 1991. China participated actively in APEC, the only official economic forum in 
the Asia-Pacific region, because otherwise the political and economic costs would be too 
high. After all, APEC was well supported with strong initiatives from Australia, Japan, 
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South Korea and the US. Therefore, participation in APEC had two significant 
implications for China.  First, China can get used to the practices of the international 
trade regime or multilateral diplomacy in APEC.  Second, APEC could be a venue where 
China can talk with other countries on the issue of its accession into WTO. This is 
especially true in the cases of the US and Japan, the major countries whom China wanted 
to engage with.  
From the record so far, China has tried to gain respect from the developing 
countries in the Asia-Pacific through APEC. In his keynote speech at the Osaka APEC 
summit in November 1995, Chinese President Jiang Zemin outlined several principles of 
China’s position on APEC. First, the APEC way of regionalism should be open. Second, 
APEC should seek to create a favourable environment for economic growth of the 
developing member countries. Developed member countries should take the lead in 
removing protectionist and discriminatory measures against the developing member 
countries. Third, the goal of liberalizing trade and investment in APEC should be 
achieved on the basis of unilateralism and voluntarism. Fourth, the pace of economic 
liberalization should be flexible. Accordingly, Jiang stated that “it is necessary to respect 
the right of all APEC members to make free decisions and use their own initiative and 
creativity when formulating targets of economic development and cooperation. The 
principle of self-determination and voluntarism in collective actions should be the 
cornerstone of APEC.”69 Thus, China calls for other APEC members to respect the rights 
of all the member countries and for the developed countries to contribute to the growth of 
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developing members. At the same time, China could claim to live up to the principle of 
open trade, which would score for China’s entry into WTO. 
APEC, however, is not an ideal place for China to enhance its international status. 
The space for China to maintain or even increase its manageability over international 
policy decisions is very limited. Since the establishment of APEC, China has kept a wary 
eye on US and Japan. China has suspicions that APEC is a post-Cold War ploy of US to 
institutionalize its power in the Asia-Pacific and to stall China’s rising power.70 APEC 
can also be a venue where Japan’s economic power in Asia is utilized for political 
purposes with the support from the US and Australia.  
Another problem with APEC is that Taiwan has the chance to enhance its 
international status with the support of some other member countries. This is certainly an 
infringement of China’s sovereignty from the Chinese perspective. A lesson was already 
learnt upon China’s entry into APEC. Because China was not an original member of 
APEC, it was difficult for China to prevent Taiwan’s participation. In order to become an 
APEC member, China compromised with the memberships of Taiwan and Hong Kong at 
the ministerial level. 
The objectives of the developed member countries are different from those of 
China. The developed countries set the target for APEC to liberalize trade and investment. 
Accordingly, they require the developing countries to carry out key economic reforms in 
market structure and governance. However, China, like the other developing member 
countries, has always insisted that economic and technical cooperation be the main 
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objective of APEC. It is hoped that through APEC dialogues China can get technical and 
economic resources from the developed countries. Economic growth instead of economic 
liberalization is China’s main purpose. Meanwhile, China is not willing to put domestic 
reforms under the surveillance of the developed countries. 
China is pressured to liberalize its economy by APEC. It is true that APEC adopts 
the principle of concerted unilateralism, which means simultaneous economic 
liberalization on a voluntary and non-binding basis. However, specific targets have been 
set out: the Bogor Declaration in 1994 committed the developed countries to realize 
liberalization by 2010 and the developing countries by 2020. The Individual Action Plan 
records each country’s annual goal and the actions actually carried out. Because APEC 
considers economic liberalization as a collective action, how to avoid the free rider 
problem is discussed with high priority. China cannot lag behind the process if it wants to 
increase its international respect. To show that China is cooperative with the APEC 
agenda, China has made several commitments. For example at the Vancouver Meeting, 
China decided to accede to the Information Technology Agreement and lower its average 
tariff to industrial products to 10% by 2005. At the Subic Meeting, Jiang also announced 
that China would try to reduce its average import tariff rate to around 15% by year 
2000.71   
China is cautious against the tendency of strengthening institutionalization of the 
APEC because she is not willing to be pressured by the goals of economic liberalization 
or the requests for carrying out domestic reforms. China has reiterated that “countries 
should expand their opening-up programme in the light of their national conditions and in 
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 60
a step by step manner.” 72  It called for APEC “to stick to the APEC Approach 
characterized mainly by respect for diversity, voluntarism and consensus.”73 Therefore 
China has insisted that APEC be a consultative body instead of a rigid institution, in order 
to prevent US from unilaterally imposing its own trade law on others.74 In order not to 
lose manageability over its foreign economic policy, China strongly advocated 
voluntarism and concerted unilateralism in APEC. This is not to deny that enhancing 
Asia-Pacific technical and economic cooperations is beneficial for China’s economic 
growth. However, only if the strategic aims of gaining respect and maintaining 
manageability can be achieved will China be ready to cooperate. 
China has more manageability over its own policies in APEC than in WTO, but at 
the same time China does not have much manageability over other countries’ policies. 
APEC is not a legally binding organization. As such, the reciprocity of trade 
liberalization from other members is not guaranteed. Moreover, it is a multilateral 
organization dominated by the big economies like Japan and the US. China’s significance 
is easily shadowed by the developed countries. APEC is not a good mechanism for China 
to forge cooperation with ASEAN. Nor is it the best tool for China to gain manageability 
over regional issues. 
 
WTO 
China joined the WTO on 11 December 2001. WTO membership means both 
obligations to remove trade barriers and rights to enjoy access to other member countries’ 
                                                 
72 Speech by Jiang Zemin at the Sixth APEC Informal Leadership Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on November 
18, 1998. Online at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t24917.htm. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Funabashi, Yoichi. Asian Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC, 162. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1995. 
 61
markets. Because Beijing has realized the necessity to integrate more with the world 
economy, it painstakingly applied for the membership. The political value of membership 
in WTO for China is that it helps to label China as a responsible international actor which 
endeavours to liberalize its own trade and world trade. In the negotiations in WTO, China 
claims that it will fight for the interests of the developing countries and against unfair 
imposition of unfair policies by the West. This corresponds with ASEAN’s intention to 
ally with China to strengthen its lobbying position in the WTO negotiation.75 ASEAN 
was worried that China’s entry into WTO would pose a threat to their trade and 
investment opportunities while they look to China for a huge market. Despite its concerns, 
ASEAN supported China’s membership application. Thus China can get international 
respect for fulfilling its international obligations, promoting international norms, 
representing the developing countries and providing economic opportunities.  
Having noted this, WTO is not ideal for China to satisfy the aims of getting 
respect and maintaining manageability at the same time. WTO’s legally binding nature 
causes China to worry about the sovereignty and independence of policy decisions. In 
China’s participation in multilateral arrangements, it has always stressed autonomy. It 
tries to avoid legally binding agreements which may allow its policy decision to be 
controlled by the rules or group decisions. Iain Johnston thinks that China’s participation 
in international organizations has been quite passive, lacking the initiative of participating 
and designing. For example, on the UN Arms Reduction Conferences, China usually 
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stresses the principles instead of proposing specific constructive measures.76 China has 
never agreed with the International Court of Justice on the authority of compulsory 
judiciary. Samuel Kim explains China’s passivity with the rationale of ‘maxi-mini’ 
approach: a strategy of maximizing the benefits of organizational participation through 
"state-enhancing" functionalism and minimizing normative costs and costs such as 
dependency and loss of sovereignty. It also refers to China's "specific exemption" and 
"specific entitlement" approach to international organizations, which leads it to seek 
special rights in international intergovernmental organizations while claiming special 
exemption from its organizational responsibilities. 77  These characteristics have been 
validated well in China’s participation in WTO.  
WTO members have to follow the rules stipulated by the GATT. Upon its 
accession into WTO, China made several commitments, including: providing non-
discriminatory treatment to all WTO members and national treatment to foreign 
businesses; eliminating export subsidies and dual price systems for exports; revising its 
existing domestic laws; and, opening all the industrial sectors. Moreover, Since China 
was a late participant in WTO, it needed to sign bilateral agreements with the member 
states and made general commitments of trade liberalization upon its accession into WTO 
in December 2001. According to WTO rule, the applicant needs to negotiate bilaterally 
with the members which are interested before it enters multilateral negotiation. These 
commitments and agreements restrain China’s policies. As many as 37 countries 
requested to negotiate with China, which was unprecedented in the history of 
                                                 
76 Johnston, Alastair Iain. “China and International Institution: From a Perspective Outside China.” In 
Construction in Contradiction: A Multiple Insight into Relationship Between China and Key International 
Organizations, edited by Wang Yizhou, 345-358. Beijing: China Development Press, 2003. 
77 Kim, Samuel S. "China's International Organizational Behaviour." In Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory 
and Practice, edited by Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, 401-34. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
 63
WTO/GATT. Because WTO adopts the principle of consensus in decision mechanism, 
the positions of several big economies were especially important for China’s accession, 
namely the US, the EU, Japan and Canada. As a result of their worries about the impacts 
on world economy by China’s fast economic growth, the terms of China's accession to 
the WTO are more far-reaching than those set for any other new member of WTO.78 
They require China to open guarded markets, such as banking, insurance, 
telecommunications and agriculture. In some sectors, the lowering of trade barriers will 
cause unemployment to rise. More importantly, China still needs to make many changes 
before it can call itself a market economy.  
Although China was dissatisfied about strict commitment, there was a plausible 
reason for compromise. China did not have other effective choices for integrating into the 
world economy. China had by then recognized the necessity to open up its economy, but 
there were no regional economic arrangements that could assure China of reciprocal 
economic treatment from other Asian countries. WTO was the only platform where 
China could negotiate the rights and obligations of reciprocal economic liberalization. 
China deemed itself to have lost many chances for entering into WTO, which symbolized 
the gateway of world markets for China. It had been fifteen years since China officially 
applied for membership to the GATT/WTO and this was a face-losing issue for Beijing. 
China recognised many costs of being excluded from the WTO. One most bitter 
cost was the political pressures from US. After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, the 
members started reassessing China’s trade regime. Starting from 1990, China had to face 
the annual review of its MFN status by the US president and the legislature. Since then, 
in the annual review by the Congress, China has been often criticized for its economic 
                                                 
78 “A Dragon Out of Puff.” The Economist, Vol.363, Iss.8277 (15 June 2002), pp. 3-5. 
 64
and political policies, including human rights, arms expansion, trade deficits, market 
accession, Taiwan and Tibet issues. This caused political tension between Beijing and 
Washington for many years. In the bilateral negotiations with US, China was often forced 
to compromise on many specific rules proposed by the US, 79 which would be applied to 
other members according to the non-discrimination principle. In 1994, new debates went 
up and the two countries were close to a major economic conflict. China was forced to 
make adjustments far beyond what it had expected. Beijing felt that its sovereignty over 
its economic as well as political policies was threatened in its integration into the world 
economy through the bilateral processes.   
Another cost would be the increasing difficulty of the membership requirements. 
After the Uruguay Round, the scope of WTO arrangement enlarged significantly to cover 
the trade in services, property rights and agricultural products.  
A third cost was that the Taiwan issue got involved in China’s membership 
application. Beijing had always tried to block any move toward Taiwan being recognized 
by the international community. Naturally, Beijing is opposed to Taiwan’s application. 
Without WTO membership, China was in a disadvantageous position to deal with this 
issue. As one Chinese negotiator recalled, ‘Beijing faced great resistance toward its own 
accession negotiation, but Beijing did not have any other choice but negotiate a deal with 
the US regarding Taiwan’s accession. Beijing was afraid that under that bad atmosphere 
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it was not impossible that Taiwan could get into GATT before Beijing—that was the last 
thing Beijing wanted to see’.80 
Therefore, China made substantial concessions in the commitments upon WTO 
entry. This may result in China having trade conflicts with other members. 
China is not sure whether it will be at an advantageous status in future trade 
disputes. It is not used to the way of WTO dispute settlements. The WTO General 
Council, as the Dispute Settlement Body, has the authority to settle trade disputes 
between members. It can endorse sanctions by a member economy against another 
member, if the latter is believed to be violating their agreements or not fulfilling its 
commitments to the WTO. The Council is made up of each representative of all the 
members. Since China became a member of WTO, it has received several complaints 
from other countries about its trade practices. In 2004, China received complainants from 
Mexico, Taiwan, Japan, the EU, and the US on its high tax on integrated circuits. 
Because the WTO dispute settlement takes a long time to reach a decision and the 
economic sanctions are carried out by the member states, the trade disputes are usually 
settled before it is brought to the WTO. However, the WTO mechanism can be a pressure 
when the two parties are negotiating bilaterally. China does not want such a pressure 
from the international community. Moreover, China does not have the confidence in 
having enough expertise to deal with trade disputes.  
WTO’s authority of reviewing member’s trade policies also makes China uneasy. 
China’s trade policies would be reviewed by WTO periodically once it became a member. 
China’s trade policy has not been reviewed since its accession. Although the policy 
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review has no implication for punishment if the trade policy is not satisfactory, it has a 
very important bearing on China’s reputation. In order to maintain her reputation, China 
has to abide by the commitments and agreements for the gradual fulfillment of all 
obligations. 
It is natural for China to worry about being controlled by other countries.  
Insisting on the status of a developing country could be China’s attempt to resist the 
manageability of WTO. Firstly, the Enabled Clause of WTO entitles developing countries 
to enjoy exemptions and preferential treatments.81 Secondly, based on the enabled clause, 
the developing countries can form FTAs with other developing countries. Thus China can 
have a free hand for FTAs, despite being a WTO member.  This is in contrast to the 
developed countries who are WTO members and who need to follow Article XXIV of 
WTO when they create FTAs.   Thirdly, China can claim to be a representative of the 
interests of all the developing countries in an effort to build a new world economic order. 
By doing this, China hopes to win the votes of the developing countries as each country 
has one vote in the WTO decision mechanism.  China tries to make the developing 
countries cooperate with it in order to prevent itself from being controlled by the 
developed member countries of WTO. One crucial way is to reach preferential economic 
arrangements with other developing countries. Cooperation with ASEAN is a perfect 
example of this.  
Using the same seven criteria as those for the cooperation proposals in the 
previous section, the existing cooperation arrangements together with China’s attitudes 
towards them are summarized in the table below (Table 3.2). 
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CMI no yes yes yes bilateral compulsory agreement support 
APT no no yes yes multilateral voluntary dialogue support 
APEC yes no no yes multilateral voluntary uncertain participate
WTO yes no no yes multilateral compulsory by rule participate
 
The utilities of existing regional and international economic arrangements for 
China are summarized in the table above (Table 3.2: Utilities of the regional and 
international economic arrangements for China). Because China cannot opt not to 
participate in the CMI, ASEAN+3, APEC or WTO, it tries to lessen the damage and 
improve the returns in joining them. If China expects the arrangement to have successful 
development and great international influence, China would be willing to participate, like 
in the case of the CMI. It supports ASEAN’s leading role in East Asian cooperation 
process to get ASEAN’s respect, hence its supportive policy on ASEAN+3. It has to be a 
member of the only inter-governmental organization in the Asia Pacific, and therefore it 
advocates the rights of developing countries in APEC. It cannot be isolated from the 
global trade system, so it pursued entry into WTO while calling for establishing a new 
international economic order. 
When China has to join an international economic arrangement, China tries to 
minimize loss of manageability over its national policies and to increase manageability 
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over the collective international decisions. In East Asian cooperation, China builds ties 
with ASEAN through ASEAN+3 in order to exert influence on regional policies. China 
advocates flexibility in ASEAN+3 and APEC as against rigidity because it does not want 
its policies to be limited by the legally binding regional agreements, especially when 
there are stronger member economies like Japan and the US. China insisted on the status 
of a developing country upon its entry into the WTO in order to get special treatment and 
to resist manageability by the rules. In general, China tries to maximize respect and 




The analysis of China’s policies on several international and regional economic 
arrangements can be summarized by the table below (Table 3.3: Utilities of the regional 
and international economic arrangements for China).  
Several points need to be highlighted from the comparison of these cases. 
Firstly, challenging US hegemony may not be the priority in China’s foreign 
economic policy decision, especially regarding international economic arrangements. 
AMF and EAFTA can serve the purpose of promoting exclusive East Asian regionalism, 
which challenges the US influence in the regional and world economy. However, China 
held negative opinions toward these two initiatives. As mentioned above, China was 
cautious about the US opposition to the idea of AMF. On the other hand, APEC and 
WTO are two organizations where the US enjoys a leadership role. Nevertheless, China 
has tried its best to participate in these two organizations.  
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This can be explained by China’s development strategy. Building up its 
comprehensive power is China’s highest goal at the current stage, including economic, 
political and military powers. It has a practical assessment of US hegemony in the world 
economy in comparison with China’s economic power. The US is still considered the 
most important country for China to engage with for trade and investment growth. 
Therefore Beijing is not willing to confront Washington directly on economic issues. 
China’s first aim for participating in regional economic cooperation is not to challenge 
US hegemony. 
 

















no no yes no multilateral voluntary uncertain 
AMF no yes yes no multilateral compulsory by quota 
CMI no yes yes yes bilateral compulsory agreement
EAFTA no no yes no multilateral compulsory uncertain 
ASEAN+3 no no yes yes multilateral voluntary dialogue 
APEC yes no no yes multilateral voluntary uncertain 
WTO yes no no yes multilateral compulsory by rule 
 
Secondly, circumscribing Taiwan’s international space is not a basic criterion in 
China’s assessment of the utility of an international economic arrangement. China 
compromised over Taiwan’s membership in APEC at the ministerial level in order to 
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achieve its own participation in 1991. The word ‘economies’ is used to describe the 
members of APEC. Taiwan is also a member of WTO as a separate customs territory. 
The title of Chinese Taipei is used for Taiwan in both organizations. The problem of 
membership therefore can be compromised in the economic arrangements. In other words, 
such arrangements are actually not very effective for blocking Taiwan’s international 
economic relations. 
Thirdly, it is questionable that China would oppose any international economic 
arrangement in which Japan has a more advantageous position than China. It can be said 
that China opposed Japan’s AMF proposal partly because it would be dominated by 
Japan. However, Japan’s economic power being a given factor in the region, China 
supported several East Asian cooperation arrangements such as EAEG, ASEAN+3 and 
the Chiang Mai Initiative. China has always expressed support for East Asian regionalism, 
which obviously cannot be achieved without Japan’s important role. Moreover, Japan is 
an important investor and importer for China. China advocates ASEAN’s leadership role 
in the East Asian integration process, which may be a strategy to limit Japan’s influence 
in the region while China is trying to catch up in the economic field. However, at the 
current stage, the aim of China’s foreign economic policy cannot be simply to defeat 
Japan. A more comprehensive and profound understanding of China’s foreign 
policymaking is needed to understand China’s behaviours. 
If the six preliminary criteria are summarized into the two criteria of respect and 
manageability, it will give a sound explanation of China’s foreign economic policy 
behaviour. Considerations are based on: whether it is very helpful for increasing 
international respect towards China; and, whether China can maintain manageability over 
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the policy decisions of its own and of that economic arrangement (See Table 3.4: Utilities 
of increasing respect and manageability for China). 
 
Table 3.4 Utilities of increasing respect and maintaining manageability for China and China’s 
attitudes 
 Increase respect Maintain 
manageability 
Attitude 
EAEC no uncertain keep a low profile 
AMF no no oppose 
CMI yes yes support 
EAFTA no no oppose 
ASEAN+3 yes yes support 
APEC yes uncertain participate 
WTO yes no participate 
 
It can be inferred that both increasing respect and maintaining manageability are 
important criteria when China evaluates its position within an international economic 
arrangement. To make the picture more clear, when the economic arrangements are 
categorized according to their utilities of achieving respect and manageability for China, 
China’s different attitudes are shown in each category (Table 3.5: Categorization of 





Table 3.5 Categorization of Utilities and China’s Attitudes 
 
 High Respect Low Respect 
High Manageability Supportive: 
CMI, ASEAN+3 
Keep a low profile: 
EAEC 





As summarized in Table 3.5, from China’s perspective, when it can get high 
respect and high manageability from an international economic arrangement, it will 
support it or even take the initiative, such as the cases of CMI and ASEAN+3. When 
China has to participate to get international respect but cannot maintain much 
manageability, or at least it is not sure it can maintain manageability, over its own 
policies as in APEC and WTO, China has chosen to participate but not propel it. Instead, 
China tries to minimize the loss of manageability by seeking flexibility and institutional 
reform toward a more favourable environment for China. When China can maintain high 
manageability over its own policy but cannot get much international respect, it keeps a 
low profile on the arrangement as in the case of the EAEC. When neither high respect nor 
manageability can be achieved such as in the cases of AMF and EAFTA proposals, China 
tends to oppose the economic cooperation arrangement. 
However, the above mentioned institutions are not ideal for China to increase 
international respect or exert manageability over the regional issues. The ideal 
arrangement would be one which brings high international respect to China and at the 
same time enables China to keep considerable manageability over national and 
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international policy decisions. Accordingly, China chose to cooperate with ASEAN 
because it can get high respect from ASEAN and from other East Asian countries. At the 
same time China can maintain manageability over its own economic policies and Sino-
ASEAN collective decisions. ASEAN+3 can help China to achieve the two objectives to 
some extent, but it is a dialogue in progress and the relatively balanced relationships 
between ASEAN and the other three countries cannot be a good mechanism for China to 
increase its manageability over the development of regional cooperation. Also, the CMI 
is a range of bilateral swap financial arrangements where Japan holds a more important 
position for ASEAN than China does. China needs a better instrument to obtain both 
international respect as well as regional manageability. ACFTA is an ideal arrangement 
for China to achieve the two objectives of respect and manageability. The next chapter 
will test the hypothesis in the case of ACFTA, and then analyze how domestic 
policymaking characteristics facilitated the final decision. 
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Chapter 4 A Case Study of ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement I:  
China’s Policy Considerations 
 
How is China’s policy of economic cooperation with ASEAN made? Although 
ASEAN does not comprise a substantial portion in China’s foreign trade and investment 
portfolio compared to US, Japan or EU, it enjoys a strategically significant position in 
China’s process of integrating into the world economy. The following two chapters will 
study the case of China’s policy making over ACFTA to understand China’s cooperation 
with ASEAN and current Chinese foreign economic policy making.  
ACFTA is chosen as the case to study China’s economic cooperation with 
ASEAN for the following reasons.  
Firstly, the signing of ACFTA happened with the background of China’s 
economic growth, liberalization and recent accession into WTO. It is a recent 
phenomenon and has received much attention from academia, industries, governments 
and international organizations. However, these economic implications are suggested 
without a comprehensive understanding of its formation and nature, especially the 
political factors.  
The relationship between ACFTA and China’s general patterns of foreign 
economic policy making has not been fully studied either. It is true that China’s current 
foreign policy has become more pragmatic than in the early decades after the PRC was 
founded. Ideology is no longer the first concern in China’s foreign policy. Economic 
interest has become indispensable in China’s policy decisions. The Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) holds economic construction as its central mission. The unchanged pattern in 
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its foreign policy behaviour is that China still shows much strategic concern based on its 
calculations of international respect and manageability. The difference from earlier times 
is that strategic economic interest is becoming an increasingly important aspect of 
China’s overall strategic concern. This difference is a subject that will be dealt with in 
more specific ways. This study can provide insights into current Chinese foreign 
economic policy making.  
Secondly, ACFTA is significant as both a result and an agenda of Sino-ASEAN 
economic cooperation. It is the first official trade agreement signed between the two 
parties, a major breakthrough in their bilateral economic relations. It is viewed to have 
significant political meaning too. The study of its formation can reflect foreign policies of 
China towards ASEAN, on regional cooperation, on major power relations and on global 
economic liberalization.  
If it is implemented, ACFTA will also be an important framework for their 
economic cooperation in the next decade. ASEAN’s worry over China’s potential 
economic challenge and expectations from intra-regional trade may find some answers 
during the process of Sino-ASEAN trade liberalization. Mutual understanding is needed 
for further bilateral cooperation. This study can offer a Chinese perspective about Sino-
ASEAN cooperation. 
Thirdly, the FTA is recognized as a form of regionalism that entails preferential 
trade liberalization among member states. 82  Economic regionalism is a significant 
character of world economy in the late twentieth century. It is evolving with many myths. 
One important question is how to explain the formation of regional economic 
                                                 
82 Other forms of regionalism include customs union, common market. A regional free trade agreement is 
one approach to achieve regional cooperation and integration, that is, free flows of capital, goods and 
labour within the region. 
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arrangements. Asian regionalism has provided very little experience in regional 
institution building. Asia or Asia-Pacific seems deviant from the major trends of 
regionalism in other parts of the world, namely Europe and North America. Studies based 
on regionalism in Europe and North America states that democracies with similar 
economic developments are easier to reach cooperation agreements compared to non-
democratic and heterogeneous countries like Asian countries.83 However, this may need 
to be qualified by the knowledge gained from the formation of ACFTA. ACFTA, the first 
binding trade arrangement in East Asia, is an important case for the study of East Asian 
regionalism and international economic cooperation. It may also trigger a new wave of 
regionalism in Asia-Pacific, leading to wider economic liberalization and institution 
building. Future developments of regional cooperation largely depend on government 
foreign policies. (Distinction between regional trade arrangements and regionalism must 
be explained.) 
The case study of ACFTA involves two basic inquiries. In the first place, why did 
China raise the proposal of establishing an FTA with ASEAN? Although some people 
think that the proposal of ACFTA was an improvised response of Premier Zhu to 
ASEAN’s expression of anxiety over China’s competition, it is over-simplified to regard 
the initiative of ACFTA an impulsive response without any policy preparations or 
considerations. If the hypothesis is correct that China’s foreign economic policy making 
is essentially aimed at respect and manageability, ACFTA should be a good tool for 
                                                 
83 See Haggard, Stephan. “The Political Economy of Regionalism in Asia and the Americas.” In The 
Political Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, 21-47. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997. 
Also see Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. “Why Democracies Cooperate 
More: Electoral Manage and International Trade Agreements.” International Organization, 56, 3, Summer 
2002, pp. 477-513. 
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China to realize the two goals. This chapter will analyze whether the case of ACFTA 
reflects such considerations of China. This will be followed by a study on the domestic 
process of China’s policy making on ACFTA in the next chapter. 
 
The Element of Respect 
As the previous chapter argues, China believes that international respect could be 
gained in several aspects through participating in an international economic arrangement. 
Those aspects include: fulfilling international obligations and advocating international 
norms; manifesting goodwill and ability to help other countries to overcome economic 
problems; playing an important role in promoting regional economic cooperation; and, 
the proposed arrangement being likely to achieve success and international influence.  
 
Fulfilling international obligations 
As China is gradually integrating into the regional and global economies, China 
would like to foster the image of a responsible member of the international community. 
FTA is an exemption from the WTO Principle of Most Favoured Nations, but WTO 
accepts FTAs in the hope that they would be building blocks for global trade 
liberalization. Although ACFTA takes the form of an exclusive regional tariff reduction 
arrangement, which is not enjoyed by non-ACFTA countries, it is essentially a measure 
towards a more liberal trade policy. The ACFTA requires China to lower its tariffs. It is 
one of the steps that China takes to open up its economy to the world, and therefore 
compatible with WTO and APEC goals. The aim of realizing ACFTA in 2010 complies 
with WTO stipulation and the goal of liberalizing trade. China made commitments upon 
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its entry into WTO to reduce most industrial tariffs to an average of 8.9 percent by 2005 
and other tariffs by 2010. Because ASEAN is connected with many major markets in the 
world such as the US, Japan and EU, and because there are many foreign investments in 
ASEAN, China can accelerate its integration into the world through economic 
cooperation with ASEAN. Implementing ACFTA can be a good experience for China to 
learn coping with legally binding trade agreements and cooperating with other economies.  
Another major economic institution in the Asia Pacific region is APEC. It has 
actually been a forum for dialogues between Asia-Pacific countries including the US, 
Canada, Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia and some ASEAN countries.84 The 
momentum of APEC slowed down since Asian countries got disappointed with its 
ineffectiveness during the Asian Financial Crisis. However, it has been regaining 
momentum. The Bogor Declaration in 1994 set the goal of forming a free trade area 
among all the members within 20 years, and early realization among its developed 
economies within 10 years. This goal seems ambitious considering the heterogeneity of 
the member countries. However, the spirit of open regionalism and inclusive membership 
are accommodated by observers in the hope that it may be a mechanism to join two major 
regional trade blocs, America and Asia, before global free trade can be achieved. China 
has always been actively participating in APEC dialogues but as mentioned previously, it 
is cautious about APEC’s inclination toward more formalization. China and ASEAN are 
both important members of APEC. The signing of ACFTA can trigger other trade 
agreements in the region, and these can be building blocks for economic liberalization in 
the Asia Pacific. 
                                                 
84 ASEAN members in the APEC include: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam. 
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ACFTA reflects changes in China’s attitudes towards the region and the world. 
China was criticized for its passiveness in the international institutions and meetings and 
for seeking exemption from international obligations. 85  China’s proposal and 
participation in ACFTA is sending a clear message that China will be more active in 
international economic issues, especially in designing and restructuring “new 
international economic order.” And, China is shouldering international obligations of 
promoting international and regional economic liberalization. 
ACFTA is the first regional trade agreement China has ever signed. The legally 
binding nature of this agreement shows that China is now willing to participate in rule-
regulated international organizations and abide by the rules. Flexibility may not be the 
precondition of China’s consideration in its choice of whether to join an international 
institution or agreement. 
 
Helping ASEAN’s economy  
In explaining why China would form an FTA with ASEAN, Chinese officials 
always stress the benefits it will bring to ASEAN economies. In the report of China’s 
expert group, it calculated the benefits for ASEAN. Their study showed possible trade 
and investment growth of ASEAN economies thanks to ACFTA. Their study showed that 
                                                 
85 See Johnston, Alastair Iain. “China and International Institution: From a Perspective Outside China.” In 
Construction in Contradiction: A Multiple Insight into Relationship Between China and Key International 
Organizations, edited by Wang Yizhou, 345-358. Beijing: China Development Press, 2003. 
Kim, Samuel S. "China's International Organizational Behaviour." In Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice, edited by Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, 401-34. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
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ASEAN’s exports to China would be 48 percent greater than without ACFTA. It would 
also increase ASEAN’s GDP by 0.9 percent.86 
China has the policy of “Yu lin wei shan, yi lin wei ban” (treating the neighbours 
kindly, regard the neighbours as partners.)87 When talking about possible negative effects 
brought by ACFTA on China, a member in the Expert Group said “we should not only 
consider our interests. We should also take ASEAN’s benefits into full consideration.”88 
It was out of this rationale that Chinese members of the expert group stressed the benefits 
for ASEAN. By assuring its neighbours of favourable market opportunities, China in turn 
gets more respect from ASEAN for its sovereignty and development.  
Before the ACFTA proposal, there were doubts among ASEAN countries that 
China would become a challenge to their economies, and perhaps to regional security. 
However, ACFTA would reduce the challenge from China because it would make 
China’s interests closely connected with ASEAN. Some ASEAN countries also doubted 
China’s sincerity in cooperating with ASEAN. Some thought that China might be trying 
to resume the ancient tributary system, while others thought that China might be giving 
up short-term economic benefits for long-term benefits both in economics and politics. 
However, according to close observers of Chinese diplomacy, Chinese mentality of 
dealing with the ASEAN has its rich tradition. In the past, China donated much to less 
developed countries to help them, such as its aid to Tanzania. It was out of the same 
mentality that China carried out debt reduction and exemption plan for Vietnam, Laos, 
                                                 
86 “Forging Closer ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the Twenty-first Century.” A report submitted by 
ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation, October 2001, p.35.  Online at the official website 
of ASEAN: http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm.  
87 Report of the 16th Congress of the China Communist Party, as quoted in Wang Yi, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of China, “Yu Lin Wei Shan, Yi Lin Wei Ban.” (Treating the neighbours kindly, regard the 
neighbours as partners.) Qiushi, Vol. 353, 16 February 2003. Online at 
http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20030216/GB/qs%5E353%5E0%5E6.htm. 
88 Personal interview with Xu Changwen at Chinse Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, February 2004. 
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Myanmar and Cambodia.89 In China’s view, neighbours are important because China’s 
needs a stable environment for growth. Economic backwardness may lead to political 
chaos and border instability. Since China is a great power, it should let neighbours benefit 
as well. Besides, China would like to show her friendliness and generosity to less 
developed smaller countries, as it did after the establishment of PRC.  
However, China’s objective has changed. During Mao’s era, China had the policy 
of exporting communist revolution. But now China does not have that ambition any more. 
If China does have any political expectations from ASEAN, it is precisely winning 
ASEAN’s respect for China. 
Trade volume between China and ASEAN is not a big portion in China’s foreign 
trade. China can therefore afford the cost of increasing trade deficits ACFTA would 
possibly bring to China. However, the political benefit—ASEAN’s respect for China, is 
very valuable for China. China needs ASEAN’s support on issues related to the Taiwan 
issue and China’s sovereignty. China tries to assure ASEAN of its benign intentions in 
the region so as to allay ASEAN’s concerns over China’s threat in the security and 
economic arenas. China has joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia. China’s positive gestures on Sino-ASEAN security relations are efforts to create a 
friendly environment for economic cooperation, while economic cooperation is helpful 
for seeking ASEAN’s cooperation on the security issues. One of the major issues in Sino-
ASEAN relations that relates to China’s sovereignty is the South China Sea issue. A great 
achievement in Sino-ASEAN security agreement coincided with the economic agreement. 
In the 2002 ASEAN-China Summit, China and ASEAN signed ACFTA and the 
                                                 
89 Personal interview with Yu Yongding and Lu Jianren at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Beijing, February 2004. 
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Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. By signing this code of 
conduct, China stressed its determination to seek a peaceful settlement of the disputes 
over the South China Sea through friendly coordination and negotiation. By providing 
ASEAN with economic opportunities, China has got ASEAN’s promise to exercise self-
restraint in the South China Sea. 
China’s ability and sincerity to help ASEAN’s growth would also be a worthy 
record of China’s bilateral international cooperation. Other partners would have more 
confidence in China in its ability to fulfil such agreements and to benefit its partners. 
 
Promoting East Asian cooperation 
East Asian countries believe that regional economic cooperation is necessary but 
the progress has been slow. Asian way of diplomacy has been noted as informal, indirect, 
unbinding, and thus there was little optimism that East Asia could form some regional 
economic area like EU or NAFTA. However, with the closer interactions between Asian 
countries and the serious damage by the Asia Financial Crisis, East Asian countries have 
been compelled to form and strengthen regional cooperation. ACFTA is a breakthrough 
in the institution-building of Asian regionalism.  
There are two regional economic blocs in the world—EU and NAFTA. However, 
as a large region, the development of regional institution in Asia is very backward. There 
have been several calls in the region to establish closer economic arrangements. But 
because of cultural, economic and political differences, progress was slow. Unbinding 
interactions are still the main pattern of Asian cooperation. The proposal of an AFTA 
among the ten ASEAN countries can be seen as the first attempt of Asian countries to 
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establish a free trade area. But AFTA is established on the basis of ASEAN, which is an 
unbinding sub-regional group in East Asia. Because some other major countries were not 
involved, namely Japan, South Korea and China, there was still no real economic 
regionalism in Asia. ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3 dialogues were held at several levels, 
which showed dedication of East Asian countries to strengthen cooperation. However, 
they have only been in the form of dialogues and processes. Substantial progress was not 
achieved until China signed ACFTA with ASEAN.  
ACFTA is the first agreement of this kind in the East Asian region. This is a great 
move to combine two big markets with a greater potential than the sum of the separate 
markets. It would be the biggest market in the world if it is successfully established. It is 
believed to bring more vitality to East Asian regional economy. China has stated on 
various occasions that it has the responsibility to promote East Asian cooperation. 
China’s participation in ACFTA can be an example of ASEAN+1 cooperation for Japan 
and Korea. China’s initiative to forge closer relations with ASEAN could stimulate other 
Northeast Asian countries to accelerate their speed in negotiating cooperation terms with 
their Southeast Asian partners. In fact Japan was also talking with ASEAN on bilateral 
economic cooperation when China proposed ACFTA, and felt that she was surpassed by 
China.90 Whether or not China is the first to establish a free trade area with ASEAN, 
ACFTA is an important part of the patchwork of East Asian cooperations. As a Chinese 
scholar suggests, the hub and spoke relations could possibly lead to the formation of a 
                                                 
90 Asahi.com, November 2001. Quoted by Pangestu, Mari and Sudarshan Gooptu. “New Regionalism: 
Options for China and East Asia.” In East Asia Integrates: A Trade Policy Agenda for Shared Growth, 
edited by Kathie Krumm and Homi Kharas, 85. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003. 
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bicycle’s wheel.91 It is likely that despite political differences in North East Asia, with 
ASEAN at the core, the three ASEAN+1 cooperations would integrate into one East 
Asian economic regionalism. 
Greater economic cooperation usually leads to more stable political relations. The 
EU started regional integration with economic cooperation and gradually spilled over into 
the political and security spheres. One example is that alongside ACFTA, China and 
ASEAN signed an agreement to fight non-traditional security problems. This is a 
measure to ensure a secure environment for the development of ACFTA, as well as a 
signal that China and ASEAN share responsibility in regional security. Besides ACFTA, 
China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in East Asia (TAC) with ASEAN 
at the 9th Bali ASEAN Summit in October 2003, which committed China to non-use of 
force in the regional disputes. ASEAN had the concern that China might use military 
force in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. However, because China has 
posited economic cooperation with ASEAN as the priority, it joined TAC to promote 
regional stability. China also signed with ASEAN a Joint Declaration on Strategic 
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity on the 9th ASEAN Summit in Indonesia in 2003. All 
these moves by China are in line with its goal of enhancing its role in economic 
cooperation and forging a closer relationship with ASEAN. 
 
Prospect of success 
As mentioned previously, China would not easily agree to a proposal of 
international economic arrangements if China foresaw dim hope in its realization, as in 
                                                 
91 Zhang, Xizhen, a seminar titled “Northeast Asian FTA Dogged Down and Seeking its Breakthrough” at 
the National University of Singapore in 2002. 
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the cases of AMF and EAFTA. China’s priority is not on those proposals which do not 
seem to have significant international influence, either. “Feasibility” is one important 
factor that China now considers towards international cooperation proposals.92 This may 
be partly related to the mentality that China does not want to lose face in the regional 
initiatives. As a big country, China would like its image as a wise and influential country. 
If China agreed to one proposal but it was later turned down, China would consider it a 
major face-losing issue. China would also expect the proposed arrangement to have some 
international influence so that as a founding member China could exert some influence 
through that arrangement. 
The prospect for the realization of ACFTA has been questioned by many people. 
Some think that because China and ASEAN have similar economic structures, it would 
be very difficult for them to negotiate the timetables for implementing tariff reduction. 
However, this does not seem to be a big problem for China. China was determined to 
make concessions in the bilateral trade with little concern for the trade deficit ACFTA 
might bring. Because China saw itself the main benefactor in this arrangement, it 
assumed that ACFTA would certainly succeed if it insists on pushing it. China does not 
expect much objection from ASEAN considering how much weight China bears. 
For China, the international influence that ACFTA would have means much more 
than the material benefits. Because it is the first East Asian free trade agreement that 
involves eleven countries with various endowments, a total population of 1.7 trillion and 
a total GDP of about US $ 2 trillion, it is destined to receive much international 
                                                 
92 Personal interview with Xu Changwen at the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, February 2004. 
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attention.93 If successful, it would be lauded as the founding block for East Asian formal 
trade integration. 
 
The Element of Manageability 
How about the possible utilities of ACFTA for China in achieving more 
management over national and regional policies? As the previous chapter suggested, 
China’s evaluation of a proposed international economic arrangement could be based on 
three criteria: whether it is multilateral or bilateral; whether it will be implemented on a 
voluntary or compulsory basis; and, how much prevailing power China will have in the 
decision making of the arrangement. 
 
Multilateral / bilateral agreement 
ACFTA involves eleven countries, namely China and ten ASEAN members. It 
was signed by ASEAN as a group. 
However, the terms of tariff reduction are negotiated on a bilateral basis between 
China and the individual ASEAN states. In other words, China negotiates separately with 
the ten ASEAN countries. The terms and conditions between China and one ASEAN 
country are kept confidential from the other ASEAN countries. And then the ten separate 
agreements will compile together as the final agreement. China is very cautious in 
keeping the details of each negotiation confidential. It believes that if the details of the 
terms and conditions in one negotiation are leaked to another ASEAN country, it would 
be very troublesome for China to adjust the terms and conditions in other negotiations. 
                                                 
93 “Forging Closer ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the Twenty-first Century.” A report submitted by 
ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation, October 2001, p.6.  Online at the official website 
of ASEAN: http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm. 
 87
And it will be very costly because it would result in the largest concessions China can 
make for each ASEAN country.94  
Moreover, if ACFTA were on a multilateral basis, ASEAN countries would 
dominate in number and at the same time maintain some cohesiveness among their group. 
Because ACFTA takes the form of a bilateral agreement, it is easier for China to handle 
as compared to a multilateral one which needs to be discussed and coordinated between 
eleven members. With the tradition of Asian diplomacy, it is imaginable that ACFTA 
would very likely become a forum for dialogues instead of a free trade area.  
China and ASEAN are working on the dispute settlement mechanism for ACFTA. 
The framework agreement suggests that a dispute-settlement mechanism will be set up 
within a year of the agreement coming into force on July 1, 2003. An amendment of the 
framework agreement stipulates that “in the case of a dispute concerning origin 
determination, classification or products or other matters, the government authorities 
concerned in the importing and exporting member states shall consult each other with a 
view to resolving the dispute, and the result shall be reported to the other member states 
for information.”95 Consultation is defined here as the only method for resolving disputes. 
 
Compulsory / voluntary implementation 
China usually prefers voluntary obligations to compulsory ones because it wants 
to have flexibility in policy making. Free trade agreements are usually legally binding 
and entail substantial exchange of market accession between the member countries. The 
                                                 
94 Personal interview with Xu Changwen, at the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, February 2004. 
95 Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, signed between the 
governments of ASEAN member countries and China in Bali, Indonesia on 6 October 2003. Online at the 
official website of ASEAN’s Secretariat: http://www.aseansec.org/15157.htm. 
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contents and timetable for trade liberalization are usually clearly stipulated in the final 
agreement after negotiation. Does ACFTA require compulsory or voluntary 
implementation? The agreement about establishing a free trade area signed between 
China and ASEAN at the Brunei Summit in 2002 is actually a framework on 
comprehensive economic cooperation. It is under negotiation between China and the 
ASEAN countries about specific obligations of trade liberalization. Once the negotiation 
is finished, the agreement would become legally binding.  
This is where a puzzle lies: why would China propose cooperation in the form of 
a free trade area? In other words, if it is compulsory, would ACFTA reduce China’s 
manageability over the national and regional policies? 
Both China and ASEAN stress the need to heed the different development levels 
of the member economies. In particular, the newer members of ASEAN, namely 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, are worried about the competition from 
Chinese products. Because there is a tradition of respecting individual country’s rights 
and interests in Asian diplomacy, ACFTA advocates different timetables for member 
countries to implement trade liberalization according to their economic development 
levels. Different timetables for industrial sectors are also allowed to alleviate negative 
impacts on domestic industries. Therefore, China feels rather safe to form such an 
agreement with its Asian neighbours. China believes that if there should be any disputes, 
substantial informal consultation between China and ASEAN would be carried out before 
resorting to any formal procedures. Given China’s economic power, no ASEAN country 
would be too difficult in dealing with the bilateral relationship. 
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More importantly, the process of realizing the free trade area is very crucial in the 
bilateral relationship. The free trade area is going to take shape in a ten year period. 
During this process, China can keep forging closer relations with ASEAN on the latter’s 
expectation of tapping into China’s market and investment. It may not be the final result 
that matters most for China. Rather, the process of engaging with ASEAN means more to 
China. China can utilize the process for building an ideal environment for its own 
development. It can also ensure its influence on ASEAN, considering rival influences 
from other countries such as Japan and the US. The compulsory nature of ACFTA can 
assure ASEAN of China’s commitment to the development of Southeast Asia. Otherwise, 
a mere dialogue would hamper ASEAN’s trust in China and probably lead it towards 
other countries to prevent the perceived challenges from China’s rise. 
Because ACFTA coincides with the WTO agenda for trade liberalization, China 
can get experience in compulsory trade reduction under an international agreement. 
China is learning to cooperate with other countries with different political and economic 
systems. It has recognized the necessity to enhance its ability and knowledge of the 
international system. However, it feels unsafe under the WTO system, which contains 
hundreds of countries including much stronger market economies familiar with the WTO 
mechanism. If China has to learn, it is safer to practice with a mechanism in a smaller 
scope. The cost would be much less if there are lessons to be learned. In order to meet the 
challenges from global economic competition, China needs a regional alliance too. 
The problem of compulsory or voluntary implementation is also related to the 
question of whether it is bilateral or multilateral, as well as how much prevailing power 
China can have. ACFTA is similar to the EAFTA proposal in the sense that both might 
 90
be legally binding and require compulsory implementation. The differences exist in two 
aspects. First, ACFTA is essentially bilateral while EAFTA is multilateral. Second, China 
has much more prevailing power than it might have in EAFTA. The third criteria for 
China to calculate its manageability in an international economic arrangement is how 
much prevailing power it can have over the collective policy making. 
 
Prevailing power in decision making 
How does China measure its prevailing power in an economic arrangement? 
Relative economic size is one measure, and other members’ dependency on China’s 
economy is another.  
China’s economic size is much larger than ASEAN countries. 96  ASEAN 
economies rely much on export for economic development, therefore more vulnerable to 
external influences. In the global economic stagnation in the 1990s, China was an engine 
that boosted economic growth with its huge market potential. The growth potential of 
China is bigger than ASEAN. ASEAN has not recovered from the damages of Asian 
Financial Crisis yet. Regional security problems and political instability also hamper the 
economic development of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Myanmar and Cambodia still suffer from political and ethnic conflicts from time to time. 
Political and social instability is a major impediment to the growth of foreign investments. 
The danger of terrorist attacks has also become a major impediment to the revival of the 
ASEAN economies. ASEAN’s economic vulnerability is also a point where China can 
win more manageability. China states that its stability is an important contribution to the 
                                                 
96 China’s GDP (PPP) is 4558555.56 International $ mn, Japan 3235379.27, US 9004174.76, and ASEAN 
as a whole is 1687409.12. Source: GDP measured at purchasing power parity: Euromonitor from the World 
Bank, 2002. 
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region. One of the evidence China often cites is its role in alleviating the Asian Financial 
Crisis by not devaluating the RMB.  
Many people think that ASEAN should take a ride on China’s economic growth. 
Some think that Southeast Asia depends on China for economic recovery. China 
apparently would like such kind of views to be adopted by the ASEAN countries as well 
as by other countries. On various occasions, China has emphasized the importance of the 
Chinese economy to ASEAN.97  
While Japan has been the biggest investor in ASEAN and US has been the biggest 
export destination for ASEAN goods, China is climbing fast on the ladder of ASEAN 
export partners, possibly to surpass both Japan and the US, as is shown in the table below 
(Table 4.1). Many ASEAN countries regard China as crucial to their economic revival 
from the Asian Financial Crisis. China’s growing domestic market is an opportunity for 
ASEAN to divert and expand their export markets. Dependence of ASEAN on China’s 












                                                 
97 For example, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan highlighted China’s contribution to ASEAN-China 
cooperation in his speech at the Meeting of China-ASEAN Dialogue in Hanoi on 26 July 2001: “Between 
ASEAN and China (10+1) last year, Premier Zhu Rongji announced that China would add a sum of US$ 5 
million to ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund, which greatly facilitated the cooperation projects between the 
two sides.”  He also stressed the benefits of China’s WTO accession for ASEAN: “I am glad to see that 
more and more ASEAN countries have come to realize that China's accession to the WTO will bring more 
development opportunities to ASEAN.”    
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Table 4.1 Ranking of China and Hong Kong combined as export destination 
 2000 2003 
Taiwan 1 1 
Korea 2 1 
Singapore 3 1 
Japan 2 2 
Philippines 6 3 
Malaysia 4 3 
Thailand 3 3 
Indonesia 4 5 
Source: Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, as quoted by The Straits Times on 18 November 2003.98 
 
It is also natural for China to consider ASEAN’s policy towards China before 
deciding on policies towards the ASEAN. There is a widespread fear of the “China 
threat” among ASEAN nations about China’s rise. While ASEAN countries regard their 
relations with China crucial for development opportunities, they also worry that China 
will take away their share in foreign export markets and their foreign direct investments. 
With such a fear, ASEAN tries to keep a balance between its relations with other major 
powers. Therefore China is eager to disabuse ASEAN of its fears.  
China stresses the benefits ACFTA can bring to ASEAN. In the ACFTA, ASEAN 
needs China’s preferential policies to benefit. Because GDP is an important indicator for 
the capacity of domestic markets, China has a much larger market than ASEAN. 
                                                 
98 “China now Singapore's top export market.” The Straits Times, Nov 18, 2003. 
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Regarding the tariff reductions each party needs to make according to ACFTA, China has 
more to offer than ASEAN. The ASEAN countries have been unilaterally liberalizing 
their economies since the 1990s and the process of regional economic liberalization 
through AFTA has supplemented this process. When ACFTA was signed, average tariffs 
in China were higher than average MFN rates of the WTO members of ASEAN.99 
Therefore, China is in a more dominant position in this agreement. In the process of 
initiating, preparing and negotiating the ACFTA, China could utilize the advantage in 
market concession to gradually increase its influence on ASEAN and in the region. It can 
manage the pace of the implementation, the timing and degree of trade and investment 
liberalization. Should there be any regional disputes in the future between China and 
ASEAN countries, China would not be in a passive position in resolving the issues.  
Because China has a great potential in market and investment, whoever can 
become China’s partner could achieve an advantage towards that country’s development. 
It is believed by many countries that China has a great potential in trade and investment 
opportunities. Some scholars think that China’s entry into the world market is changing 
the structure of the world economy. It is gradually integrating and opening to the world. 
In this process, countries that get access to China’s market and resources will benefit 
more than others. As a developing country which has not enough confidence in 
international participation, China is carrying out “controlled liberalization”— economic 
liberalization closely regulated by the state. Which industrial sectors to lower tariffs and 
to which countries China lower tariffs are generally decided by the Chinese government, 
namely MOFCOM. This is a process controlled by the Chinese government and therefore 
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to give which countries the opportunities is likewise the Chinese government’s choice. 
As will be mentioned in the following discussions, private or foreign sectors in China 
cannot have much influence in the policymaking process. By signing ACFTA, China has 
chosen to give the opportunities and preferential policies firstly to ASEAN. This puts 
ASEAN economies in a more advantageous position than other countries which compete 
for accession into China’s domestic market. Besides, there are differences among China’s 
policies for the ten ASEAN members. In the process of ACFTA negotiation and 
realization, there would be early packages for some products. There would be also special 
treatments for less developed ASEAN members such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 
Therefore it is a question for other countries to think how to win China’s preference in its 
trade policies. A country’s trade policy is usually strategic. This is especially the case 
with China. ACFTA will be an example that China can show to other countries that it 
would be wise for other countries to establish strategically friendly relations with China. 
The confidence and interdependence between China and ASEAN would be 
increased as well. With the realization of ACFTA, the economic interdependence of 
China and ASEAN would be increased. Shared interests in economic cooperation will 
make the cost too high for each party to withdraw from the agreement.  
China’s manageability over regional policies is not limited to the relationship 
between China and ASEAN. After the cold war, China fears that the bi-polar world will 
turn into a uni-polar one dominated by the US and hence it has been advocating a multi-
polar world. In the maps drawn by Chinese strategists, the poles are the US, Russia, 
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Japan, EU and China.100 Although ASEAN is not regarded a global pole, China started 
reassessing ASEAN’s important role at least after the stand-off in the Taiwan Straits and 
the subsequent revitalization of the Japan-US alliance, which indicated the possible 
scenario of mono-polarity.101 ASEAN’s significant decline of economic power during the 
Asian Financial Crisis made China worry about its own economic security. China 
realized the degree of economic and strategic dependency of ASEAN on the West, and 
the danger brought by this dependency to the interest of China. The regional contagion 
showed its destructive power during the Crisis. Chinese officials think that ASEAN’s 
concern in averting a recurrence of the crisis is helpful to promote China’s economic 
security. Hence China concluded that ASEAN economies should be strengthened. Three 
policy objectives are identified by Chinese former Premier Zhu Rongji. They are: first, to 
enhance its own stability and development; second, to maintain peace and tranquillity in 
the region; and third, to conduct dialogues and build up cooperation with regional 
countries.102 
 As to the reason why China did not form FTA firstly with its northeastern 
neighbours, it is widely said that the historical resentment and political distrust are too 
high between China and Japan to reach economic agreement. There is also some 
historical resentment between Japan and South Korea that impedes regional cooperation. 
However, given the size and development of Japanese and Korean economies, China may 
not have a prevailing power in the arrangements involving the two.103 
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China does not claim leadership in East Asia. Chinese policymakers hold that 
ACFTA is modelled on AFTA, which is evidence that China advocates ASEAN’s role in 
promoting regional cooperation and institution building.104 The rhetoric that China has no 
intention to dominate East Asia is also sending a signal that Japan should not seek 
leadership either, but rather support ASEAN’s leading role in building the East Asian 
region. This is illustrated in Zhu Rongji’s statement at the Informal ASEAN+1 Summit in 
1999:  
 
We believe that ASEAN will maintain its characteristic self-respect, self-
improvement and independence, strengthen its internal unity and cooperation in 
accordance with such effective principles as equality and mutual benefit and 
decision by consensus, and play a more active and constructive role in promoting 
regional multi-polarity and peace and development.105 
 
Although ASEAN’s economic power is not as strong as China’s or Japan’s, it can 
play a leadership role, namely, coordination leadership.106 Because of the rivalry between 
China and Japan, it is difficult to reach regional consensus if the coordination is done by 
either one. Although ASEAN countries are smaller economies compared to their 
northeastern partners, their number constitutes the majority of East Asian countries. 
Besides, their cohesiveness and success in building a Southeast Asian group can give 
them credit in making similar achievement in East Asia.  Because of its dominant 
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majority in the number of countries and its non-threatening status, ASEAN can 
coordinate the process of regional cooperation without being seen as hegemonic or anti-
hegemonic. If ASEAN becomes the acquiesced leader in the regionalization of Asia, then 
China would be in an advantageous position to influence the policy negotiations and 
outcomes. After all, ASEAN countries expect trade and investment opportunities from 
China through ACFTA. At the same time, China has been gradually increasing its 
participation in the design and building of regional institutions and traditions. The simple 
fact that it was China who initiated the East Asia institution building as demonstrated by 
the ACFTA has shown that China has the ability of designing and restructuring Asia. As 
a rising power, China shows that it can create institutions, regional cooperation and 
international rules. It not only will cooperate, but also can make others cooperate. 
Building ACFTA will bring more vitality to East Asian economy. At the same time, 
ASEAN’s dependency upon China will be increased as well. As a result, China’s 
influence in the region will be realized and increased. It can better manage regional 
collective decisions. 
  
In summary, ASEAN qualifies best in the mindset of China’s foreign policy 
strategy based on respect and manageability. Since China is very important for ASEAN 
in economic revival, stability and long-term development, China can gain respect from 
ASEAN by extending the goodwill of economic cooperation. Taking an unprecedented 
initiative of East Asian cooperation also wins China respect from the regional community. 
At the same time, China can manage the economic relationship with ASEAN. ASEAN 
qualifies better than other countries in China’s choice of developing closer economic 
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relationship. Building ACFTA is China’s strategy to achieve its foreign policy goal of 
increasing respect and regional manageability without losing control over its own policies. 
If the policy considerations on ACFTA satisfy China’s overall national strategy in 
its economic diplomacy, the domestic actors would not necessarily approve the signing of 
the agreement if their interests would be affected. Why could the proposal be successfully 
approved in China within one year as a policy decision? What patterns of China’s 
policymaking process propelled the policy decision? The next chapter will then inquire 




Chapter 5  A Case Study of ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement II: 
China’s Policymaking Process 
 
For a foreign policy to be successfully adopted by a country, it not only needs to 
suit the national strategy, but also needs to get approval from the domestic policymakers. 
If it is true that ACFTA perfectly suits current Chinese foreign policy goals as discussed 
in the previous chapter, it may not be welcomed by Chinese domestic actors for fear of 
possible adverse economic effects it may bring.107 However, it took barely one year for 
China to study the proposal of ACFTA before it was endorsed by the Chinese and 
ASEAN leaders in the 2001 ASEAN-China Summit and only another year to have it 
formally signed. How could the proposal be successfully approved in China? This 
chapter will study the patterns and characteristics of Chinese foreign economic policy 
making to see how they have facilitated the expeditious policy decision on ACFTA.  
The study of the policymaking process of ACFTA was mainly carried out through 
the author’s field research in China from January to February 2004. Interviews were 
conducted with Chinese officials and academics at the local and central administrative 
levels. Most of the interviewees were either involved in or familiar with the policymaking 
process of ACFTA. Some of them were from the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies and the 
Institute of World Economy and Politics at CASS, and some from the institute affiliated 
with MOFCOM. Others were officials who were working for MOFCOM or the local 
division of the Ministry. 108  The interviewees will be kept anonymous in this thesis 
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because of sensitivity of some issues and requests by some interviewees. For each 
interview, questions were asked to the interviewees and notes were usually taken during 
the conversations. Sometimes notes were written down immediately after the interview to 
ensure as much accuracy as possible. One limitation of the interviews in this study was 
that the range of interviewees was not very broad. It was also sometimes difficult to 
discuss with the policymakers about the details of the policymaking process. This reflects 
the persistent opaque nature of Chinese policy making. However, through the case study 
of ACFTA, the author was able to gain some insights into the Chinese foreign economic 
policymaking system.  
 
Policymaking Process of ACFTA 
Although it is generally held that East Asian economic cooperation gained 
momentum after the Asian Financial Crisis, China’s foreign policy of cooperating with 
the ASEAN actually started before the crisis. With economic reform and opening-up 
being the core of the national strategy since 1978, China has been gradually opening up 
its markets. The end of the Cold War meant to China the opportunity of building a multi-
polar world. The 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the ensuing sanctions by the Western 
countries taught China a lesson on the danger of international isolation. That was a 
watershed, where China started to prioritize the importance of a stable and friendly 
neighbour environment especially in Southeast Asia, for its economic development. 
According to an expert at the Ministry of Commerce of China, the government started 
considering initiating economic cooperation with other East Asian countries at least as 
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early as in the mid-1990s. The major research task was taken up by scholars at the 
Institute of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC).109  
However, it is questionable whether those researches received enough attention 
from the policymakers to turn into reality. As one expert recalled, it was difficult for the 
research reports to have substantial impact on the policy decisions. Chinese foreign 
economic policies were usually based on economic benefits, that is, to increase short-
term foreign investment and trade revenues. Foreign economic policies were hardly 
coordinated with the political policies, which means MOFTEC seldom coordinated with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on foreign economic policies. 110  Therefore, 
Chinese foreign economic policymaking was hardly strategic or political in nature. In 
other words, China seldom made economic policies out of strategic or political 
considerations. 
The Asian Financial Crisis made East Asian countries including China realize the 
tremendous threat of international economic instability by which China was also affected. 
During the crisis, the Chinese government maintained the value of the Chinese currency 
RMB. It reiterated that it did so in order to help the Southeast Asian nations to combat the 
crisis and to protect Asia from further damages by the crisis. On various occasions, China 
cited its contributions to the regional economy. China also realized that without regional 
arrangements, when there was an international economic crisis, the effect could be 
contagious and disastrous. The risk was too high not to have a regional arrangement as an 
anti-crisis mechanism. The ability of China’s financial system to resist external peril was 
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questioned by domestic observers. Chinese leaders learned a lesson from the crisis-hit 
countries that too much liberalization in China’s financial system was dangerous. 
Although Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s proposal of an EAEG in 1990 
was not successful because of the objection by the US, East Asian cooperation kept its 
momentum in the late 1990s. In 1996 China was promoted as a Full Dialogue Partner 
Country of the ASEAN as against the previous status of a consultative partner. China 
became more active in its diplomatic interactions with ASEAN, especially since 1997. In 
December 1997 on the first ASEAN-China Summit, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and 
the ASEAN leaders issued a joint statement, proclaiming the establishment of the good-
neighbourly partnership of mutual trust oriented towards the 21st century, which has 
since been often quoted by the Chinese diplomats as one that “chartered the course of 
overall and long-term development of bilateral relations”.111 
Following the suggestion of the South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, EAVG 
was set up in December 1998. It was made up by experts from several East Asian 
countries to study the prospects of East Asian Cooperation. Chinese experts in the EAVG 
came from the China Academy of Social Sciences and MOFTEC. In 2001 on the 
ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei, EAVG came up with a report. It suggested that an East 
Asian Community be established as the long-term goal of East Asian countries. It also 
suggested promoting East Asian comprehensive cooperations including establishing an 
East Asian Free Trade Area. 
At the same time, in the late 1990s, China was in the process of negotiating her 
entry into the WTO. There was a great impetus from the MOFTEC and the leadership to 
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achieve success on the WTO accession within the year 2001, given that China had 
realized the need to open up its market to the world economy and join the global 
institution. Coincidentally, because Taiwan also applied for a WTO membership, China 
firmly insisted entering WTO before Taiwan. Although China realized the necessity of 
joining the multilateral trade agreement, it was not fully prepared for the subsequent 
implications. The public and some industrial sectors were warning against possible 
impacts from foreign products on domestic ones, and of China’s institutional weakness in 
dealing with global monetary flux and legal disputes. Particularly, numerous state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) could face fierce competition from foreign products and go bankrupt. 
The possible scenario of unemployment and an unstable national economy were regarded 
as the most destabilizing factors for Chinese society and the Communist regime. Advisers 
warned that China should take precautionary measures to prevent negative effects during 
the process of economic opening to the world. The East Asian region was identified as a 
crucial environment for China’s sound development. Maintaining national security was 
also thought of as a precondition for economic growth. Therefore territorial and political 
disputes with ASEAN were decisively put aside by Chinese leaders. Instead, the 
emphasis in diplomacy was turned to economic relations.  
With the gradual involvement in the regional and international society, China 
found it inadequate to simply mind its own economic development while taking a low 
profile on various international issues. Growing economic inter-dependence with other 
economies made it necessary for China to take an active role in regional and global 
economic institutions. The need for a peaceful external environment also motivated 
China to strengthen ties with regional countries through international institutions and 
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economic cooperation. Chinese leaders gradually increased their presence at various 
regional and international organizations and conferences. Their style and attitude seemed 
to become more adapted to international practices. Chinese policy makers became 
obviously more aware of China’s image as a responsible and respectable country in the 
international society. As a reflection, Chinese leaders started to emphasize China’s 
contribution and importance to the world.112 
There was anxiety among ASEAN countries that China’s entry into WTO would 
cause ASEAN economies to suffer from loss of investment and foreign markets. There 
were many discussions in ASEAN countries on whether China, with its gradual 
integration into the world economy, would become a competitor or a partner for ASEAN. 
Some were concerned that China would cause ASEAN to lose foreign investments. A 
prevalent phenomenon in Southeast Asia was that foreign companies shifted their 
investment to China, because of the slackened economy in Southeast Asia after the Asian 
Financial Crisis, political instability in some of the ASEAN countries, cheaper labour 
cost in China and investors’ awareness of China’s market potential. Some were 
concerned that China would compete with them in foreign markets such as Japan, US and 
EU on exports because they have similar export structures. ASEAN countries often 
expressed their concern over China’s possible challenges toward their economies.113 
At the same time, the US was trying to strengthen its relationship with ASEAN 
after the 9.11 Incident. Japan was also negotiating with ASEAN about closer economic 
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arrangements. Some internal reports prepared for Chinese leaders mentioned the 
developments abroad and suggested that China’s progress should be kept up with the 
regional cooperation.114 
At the 2000 ASEAN-China Summit in Singapore, East Asian leaders continued to 
discuss the prospects of cooperation. In the discussion between China and ASEAN 
leaders, many ASEAN countries expressed their worries about the impact of China’s 
entry into WTO on ASEAN economies.115 In response, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
raised the subject of studying the cooperation opportunities between China and ASEAN. 
He suggested that a free trade area be established among China and ASEAN countries 
within ten years.116 That was the first time the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area was 
proposed. At that Summit, the countries agreed to study the plausibility of ACFTA 
respectively. In fact, before they signed the ACFTA agreement, some ASEAN countries 
had reservations about China’s proposal fearing China’s competition and encroachment 
into their domestic market. The national report of Laos, for example, cautioned that “the 
right steps [toward] liberalization must be taken as a serious matter, otherwise we could 
step on the area of land mines.” 117 
As was agreed at the Summit, each country would study the feasibility of ACFTA 
and give their individual country reports. Accordingly, the Chinese government 
organized a Chinese Experts Group to study both the impacts of China’s WTO entry on 
ASEAN economies, and Sino-ASEAN economic cooperation, particularly ACFTA. The 
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Chinese Experts Group was made of five scholars from CASS and MOFTEC. They were 
either close observers of China’s foreign relations in the Asia Pacific or experts on Asian 
economy. The emphasis of the Experts Group’s study was initially put on the impact of 
China’s WTO entry on ASEAN economy. However, both China and ASEAN countries 
gradually shifted their focus towards studying Sino-ASEAN cooperation possibilities 
especially about a free trade area. 118  
In China, the study and discussions on ACFTA after Zhu’s proposal was mostly 
led by the MFA. The Asia Department of MFA was the main body in charge. With a 
dedication to make the ACFTA proposal to be adopted by domestic and international 
decision makers, MFA made much effort in propelling the idea.  Since ACFTA was 
actually an economic arrangement, MFA had much consultation with MOFTEC. Joint 
meetings were often held between the two ministries. Sometimes, the meetings invited 
other people to join the discussion, including local governments and representatives from 
domestic industries. Sometimes there were different opinions from local governments 
and industrial ministries. Some provinces showed anxiety on the increasing trade deficit 
with ASEAN countries, and raised the spectre of potentially more deficit that could be 
brought about by ACFTA. These provinces include those which border ASEAN countries, 
and which have been trading actively with them, including the provinces of Yunnan and 
Guangxi. As a response to their anxieties, MOFTEC tried to make them understand the 
significance of such a policy for China, and to assure them of opportunities ACFTA 
could bring to local economies. The provinces apparently accepted the two reasons.119 
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Industrial ministries were sometimes invited to some meetings to discuss specific topics 
related to sectoral trade liberalization. Some industries expressed concern about the future 
competition from ASEAN products such as agricultural and electronic products. 
A tentative report was submitted by the Institute of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperations to MOFTEC. There were concerns in the report that there might be 
negative effects of ACFTA on China’s economy.120 However, this internal report has 
been kept confidential. Several working meetings were held at MOFTEC to discuss 
ACFTA. MFA was actively involved in the discussions. As is usually the case in Chinese 
policy making, a positive opinion was formed at the meetings in support of ACFTA. 
According to one participant to the meetings, MFA was the main government institution 
that organized the evaluation process.121 Since the agreement was mainly on foreign trade, 
the report of the expert group was submitted to the Chinese leadership through MOFTEC.  
A meeting of the experts from China and ASEAN countries was held in Beijing in 
April 2001. It was agreed that the theme of their study would be "Forging Closer 
ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the 21st Century." After considering the outlines 
of studies drawn up by both sides, the experts consolidated the elements into a single 
outline. They also agreed that a joint team of ASEAN and Chinese researchers be formed 
to carry out the work, namely, the ASEAN-China Experts Group on Economic 
Cooperation. The report with the agreed theme was submitted by the team of researchers 
to the ASEAN-China Summit in Brunei in October 2001, and it was endorsed by the 
Chinese and ASEAN leaders. 
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At the 2002 Summit, China and ASEAN formally signed the framework 
agreement. Since then, MOFTEC has taken over the main responsibility from MFA to 
implement ACFTA on the Chinese side. MOFTEC has since then been in charge of 
negotiating separately with ASEAN countries the specific measures to implement the 
agreement with the goal of establishing ACFTA within ten years. “Early package” tariff 
deductions were agreed to be carried out by the Chinese government on some ASEAN 
products. These were usually regarded as sensitive and difficult sectors. Some Chinese 
scholars think that the Chinese government was promoting the realization of cooperation 
by giving concessions. However, MOFTEC is dedicated to realizing ACFTA and holds 
that there should be little problem to meet the deadline. 
Based on the description of the policymaking process of ACFTA, some patterns 
need to be sorted out and highlighted in order to analyze current Chinese foreign 
economic policy making and its impact on Sino-ASEAN cooperation. The next part will 
then analyze the policymaking structure, with an emphasis on domestic actors in China. 
 
Characteristics of Chinese Policymaking on ACFTA 
After Premier Zhu Rongji’s proposal of a free trade area at the Fourth ASEAN-
China Summit in Singapore in 2000, it took only one year for China and ASEAN to come 
up with an Expert Group Report endorsed by the Chinese and ASEAN leaders at the 
Brunei Summit in 2001. It took only another year before the framework agreement was 
formally signed by the leaders at the Phnom Penh Summit. How could the proposal 
change into a working framework so quickly? What are the patterns and characteristics of 
current Chinese foreign economic policymaking that facilitated the adoption of ACFTA? 
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This study found that the centralization in decision making was the most prominent factor 
expediting China’s approval of the ACFTA. This was supported by the involvement of 
experts and the inputs of strategic and political thinking into the decision making.  
 
Centralization in decision making 
Many scholars hold that the policymaking of contemporary China is undergoing 
decentralization and democratization. As mentioned previously, Barnett observes the 
trends of regularization and professionalization in the Chinese foreign policy making 
process.122 Oksenberg and Lieberthal believe policy outcomes were the result of power 
struggle of related ministries in efforts to maximize their respective interests.123 Lampton 
holds that in the 1990s, China’s foreign policymaking was undergoing several major 
changes: professionalization, internationalization, decentralization and 
democratization.124 
However, such kinds of statements need further empirical testing. This study, on 
the contrary, finds that current Chinese foreign economic policy making is centralized to 
a high degree. It is not known whether there has been a decentralization process or 
whether Chinese policy making has always remained centralized since the 1950s. 
However, it can be argued that the centralized character of Chinese policy making was a 
crucial factor with reference to the adoption of China’s ACFTA policy. Centralization 
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was the mode of operation of the Chinese leadership, the bureaucracy, other actors, and 
the relations among them. 
 
Charismatic leadership 
Max Weber defines charismatic authority as one that “seizes the task that is 
adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission.”125 
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the first and second generations of Chinese political 
leadership, were typically charismatic leaders in nature.  
For the third generation leadership, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu 
Rongji had a fairly clear job distribution. Because Zhu was well versed in trade and 
economics, Jiang relied heavily on Zhu for managing economic reforms. Jiang also 
supported Zhu when the latter had problems. This was one important reason why Zhu 
enjoyed much autonomy in implementing his policies, including ACFTA. 
Zhu shouldered most responsibility in making economic policies, and he had 
control over most financial and macro-economic units. Zhu’s leadership was the 
charismatic kind. His upright and determined personality was famous at home and abroad. 
In times of economic problems, the Chinese generally looked to him for salient economic 
policies. He made brave policies that were often ground breaking. Dubbed as the 
“Economic Tsar” of China, Zhu’s style of statecraft was often “authoritarian”—using the 
visible hand of state to enforce market reform.126 On foreign policies, he paid many 
fruitful visits to other countries. Naturally, he had much autonomy and influence on 
China’s economic diplomacy. As observed by Barry Naughton, “Zhu Rongji personally 
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dominates the ultimate policy-making decision. His self-confidence and impatience lead 
to a personalized but also broadly consultative process. Zhu will not hesitate to summon 
the person whose views he wishes to solicit, regardless of their formal affiliation. He is 
also entirely capable of ignoring professional advice and basing decisions on his own 
instincts.”127 
Foreign economic policies were basically managed by Premier Zhu. Zhu was 
determined to open China’s economy to the world and to act according to international 
rules. He had led China’s pursuance of the WTO membership. When Zhu failed to secure 
American approval of China’s WTO entry on his visit to the United States in April 1999 
despite what some Chinese considered humiliating trade concessions, it seemed as if 
Zhu’s star had fallen, and Zhu had to maintain a low profile for several months. However, 
when Zhu succeeded in concluding a bilateral agreement with the United States on 
China’s WTO entry in November 1999, he returned to good graces even though some 
Chinese officials feared the political and economic consequences of WTO membership. 
Immediately after this triumph, Zhu embarked on a high profile tour of Southeast Asian 
nations and represented China at the ASEAN summit. Zhu was very active in 
participating in regional forums and dialogues in East Asia. He attended the third 
ASEAN+3 Summit in Manila, offering China's advice on the direction and scope for 
cooperation among the East Asian countries. He also attended the fourth, fifth and sixth 
ASEAN+3 Summit in Singapore, Brunei and Cambodia respectively from 2000 to 2002. 
In each meeting, he expressed Chinese views on East Asian cooperation. He called for 
closer economic cooperation in trade, investment and technology. He also attended the 
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third, fourth, fifth and sixth ASEAN-China Summits from 1999 to 2002 alongside the 
ASEAN+3 summits. Over the issue of China’s relations with its neighbours, Zhu had 
proactive views that China should strengthen comprehensive cooperations with ASEAN.  
It was basically Zhu Rongji’s idea to propose the ACFTA. Zhu suggested that 
establishing a free trade area between China and ASEAN could be one form of 
cooperation. He also set the aim of achieving the goal within ten years. Because the 
political leaders are believed to be pursuing national interests, they are often entrusted 
with the power to make foreign political and economic policies. Besides, Zhu was 
believed to be familiar with foreign economic issues. As a result, Premier Zhu played a 
dominant role in Chinese foreign economic policy making. As happened in the case of 
ACFTA, although everyone at home was surprised to hear about Zhu’s proposal, their 
immediate response was to adjust to this policy and not to resist it. Zhu’s leadership was 
the most decisive factor for the formation of ACFTA. 
 
Compliant bureaucracy 
In the policymaking of ACFTA, only two ministries were involved, namely MFA 
and MOFTEC. Because Zhu was the major leader in charge of China’s economy, 
MOFTEC, which was subordinate to the State Council, was basically under Zhu’s 
leadership. In other words, MOFTEC was one of the major government institutions that 
carry out Zhu’s policies. The ministry learned well about Zhu’s style and thoughts. It was 
natural for them to learn of the importance of Southeast Asia from the diplomatic 
activities of Zhu and other Chinese diplomats in Southeast Asia. They also understood 
the leadership’s direction on diplomacy to strengthen China’s relations with the 
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neighbours. As a result, they started to study the cooperation possibilities with other East 
Asian countries including Southeast Asia in the mid-1990s and accepted the proposal of 
ACFTA uncritically. 
In Zhu’s time, MOFTEC was in charge of foreign economic issues, while the 
Committee of Economy and Trade (CET) under the State Council was in charge of both 
domestic and foreign economic issues and officially had a higher rank than MOFTEC. 
With the likelihood of the liberal policies of MOFTEC causing redistribution of domestic 
economic interests, it sometimes had to face various forms of opposition from domestic 
industries. CET was often the place where domestic oppositions were expressed. When 
MOFTEC was restructured to MOFCOM, CET was abolished and some of its functions 
were merged into MOFCOM. The restructuring was done because the Chinese 
government needed to coordinate domestic and foreign economic policies better in the 
process of opening up. On the surface, the restructuring conveyed a message to domestic 
industries that they would receive the equal treatment in competing with foreign 
companies. In actual practice, this transformation implied that foreign economic policies 
have enjoyed priority in policy in the early 2000s compared to domestic economic 
policies. It was not surprising that MOFTEC and MFA were the organizers in the 
decision making of ACFTA although the free trade arrangement was closely related to 
domestic industries. The MOFTEC enjoyed high authority under Zhu’s leadership, thus it 
could easily enforce the domestic approval of ACFTA. 
Like MOFTEC, MFA pays much attention to complying with the wishes of the 
leadership. Diplomats strictly watch their speeches and make sure they comply with the 
policies of the higher ranks. In the 1990s, the policy of MFA followed Beijing’s direction 
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to promote Sino-ASEAN relations closely. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen was the first person to represent China in ASEAN meetings, which started the 
new age of Sino-ASEAN relations. Tang Jiaxuan was also actively involved in 
diplomatic missions to ASEAN. With the general national policy of promoting friendly 
neighbourliness, MFA was exploring the ways and means to enhance China’s relations 
with ASEAN. However, because of historical and political reasons as noted in this study, 
there had not been a suitable channel to realize this aim until Premier Zhu proposed 
ACFTA. As a result, MFA was the major institution in the preparation period for ACFTA 
before the agreement was formally signed by the Chinese and ASEAN leaders. 
The practices of MOFTEC and MFA could be understood from the traditions of 
Chinese bureaucracy. One of the core traditions in Chinese bureaucratic culture is to 
comply with decisions from the top. The opportunity of promotion is usually decided by 
a few high ranking officials, to a large extent by measuring how much the subordinate 
has carried out decisions from the top. The immediate goal of the bureaucratic system is 
to realize the leader’s initiatives and plans. Even though sometimes the leader’s orders 
seem not very easy to achieve, people within the bureaucratic system will try their best to 
make the reality closer to the orders. In the case of ACFTA, the ministries acted 
consistently according to its supposed responsibility in the policymaking procedure, with 
no one wanting to be labelled as an impediment to the realization of the great foreign 
policy of Premier Zhu.  
Consistency with the leadership is regarded as an important aspect of Chinese 
diplomacy. As is the case in various situations, Chinese diplomats would not easily make 
decisions without approval from the higher ranks. It has been noted that Chinese 
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diplomats have little elbow room in international negotiations.128 This might stem from 
the nature of foreign policy. Decisions of foreign policy do not usually incur immediate 
impact on domestic interests unlike domestic economic reforms. Therefore they are easier 
to implement and have no direct impact on government officials themselves. The 
performance of MOFTEC, for example, was not usually measured with the actual profits 
that China gained from international trade and investment, but whether they have 
complied with leadership directions which are believed to represent the national interests. 
Because opening up has been set by Deng Xiaoping as a national strategy, expansion of 
international economic activities per se is often considered evidence of China’s 
development, and as an achievement of MOFCOM. 
There was also a ‘face saving’ issue involved in the policy making process. It is 
regarded shameful by the Chinese diplomats to have conspicuous inconsistencies in their 
foreign policy stances. Therefore diplomats are usually very prudent in their speeches. 
They are very cautious about giving new comments on Chinese foreign relations. Once a 
leader has set a principle or long-term goal for China’s foreign policy, Chinese 
bureaucrats would often quote the leader’s directions and certainly avoid defying 
previous goals. It is considered face losing if China’s previous announced goals should 
fail. 
The remaining question was just how to begin closer cooperation in East Asia. 
There were many difficulties for East Asian countries to form an East Asian free trade 
area in a short time.129 Therefore, MOFTEC was contemplating over the proper steps to 
gradually shape China’s regional cooperations. It should be noted that although 
                                                 
128 Kreisberg, Paul H. “China's Negotiating Behaviour.” In Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 
edited by Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, 453-480. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
129 See discussions in Chapter 3, especially the parts regarding EAFTA. 
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MOFTEC would like East Asian economic cooperation to be realized, MFA did not hold 
the same view. MFA was often very sceptical towards Japan’s intentions in the region.130 
This was a result of deep distrust in Sino-Japan political relations. MFA suspected that 
Japan wanted to be a regional hegemon in East Asia. People in MFA thought that given 
its economic domination, Japan would probably seek regional political leadership 
through institution building in East Asia. As a result, it was difficult for MFA to accept 
Japan’s initiatives of East Asian economic cooperation.131 Although MOFTEC was in 
charge of China’s foreign economic relations, it had to coordinate with MFA on some 
foreign economic policies which have political significance. Because MFA was not 
prepared for an East Asian economic arrangement which includes Japan, MOFTEC 
thought it was more practical to wait for the right moment when conditions for East 
Asian cooperation are more mature. Discussions on cooperation with ASEAN seemed not 
a particular topic within MOFTEC. As a result, Zhu’s proposal of a free trade area with 
ASEAN took MOFTEC by surprise. 
Nonetheless, it was not difficult for people in China to follow Zhu’s proposal. 
Besides the reasons of complying with the leader’s decisions and saving face, the spirit of 
ACFTA was in line with the mainstream belief of MFA and MOFTEC. Certainly one of 
the most important diplomatic tasks of MFA was to promote China’s relations with 
ASEAN. According to a MOFCOM official, the majority of MOFTEC personnel were 
made of people who believed in economic liberalization. They supported China’s entry 
into WTO and took the main responsibility in negotiating its realization. Since China 
applied to resume its membership in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, they 
                                                 
130 Personal interview with an official at the Asian Department at MOFCOM, Beijing, February 2004. 
131 Ibid. 
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envisioned the necessity of deeper cooperation between Asian economies. They believed 
that China should forge closer economic relations with ASEAN countries.132  
 
Other marginal actors 
In the decision making process of ACFTA, did other actors have substantial 
influence on the policy outcome, such as ministries other than the MFA and MOFTEC, 
local governments, business people and academia? 
MFA and MOFTEC did hold working meetings to which people from various 
backgrounds were invited to discuss the possible effects and feasibility of ACFTA. They 
included people from the academia, industrial ministries, customs administrators, and 
local governments. In fact, different opinions were expressed in the meetings. Some 
industrial ministries expressed their concern that ASEAN products would probably cut 
into the domestic market of Chinese products, for example, the agricultural and the 
electronic products.  
In the present Chinese political structure, industrial ministries are institutions 
which represent the interests of the industries and businesses. Because there are no 
independent labour unions or influential industrial associations in China, government 
ministries are the channel where the enterprises and business people can express their 
opinions. The ministries sometimes ask business people about their opinions. But it relies 
totally on the ministry’s decision as to which of the opinions are to be taken, whether to 
report them to the leadership and whether to coordinate with other ministries. Obviously, 
the industrial ministries did not oppose ACFTA strongly. Their acceptance might stem 
from their reverence and compliance to the leadership. The reason might as well be that 
                                                 
132 Personal interview with an MOFCOM official, Beijing, February 2004. 
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the ministries did not have much concern for some industrial sectors or companies. 
Although some industries were likely to be affected by ACFTA, the ministries estimated 
that the costs would not be too high considering the size of ASEAN economies and 
bilateral trade volumes so far.133 Besides, even if the interests of some industries and 
companies are negatively affected, the function and the posts of the officials would not be 
much affected.  
Some local governments were concerned about potential increase in trade deficits 
with ASEAN. As mentioned previously, the provinces which border ASEAN countries 
were among the most concerned, including Yunnan and Guangxi. However, the concerns 
were mixed with hope for greater chances for development. The border trade had so far 
been an enlivening element to the local economies. As a result, local governments 
seemed to have no clear analysis over the possible effects of ACFTA, especially over the 
challenges ahead. Moreover, they were obliged to comply with opinions of the central 
government at the working meetings. The official reports from provinces in the 
Southwest and Southeast China emphasized the bright side of the picture. As if there was 
a firm consensus, several provinces in China came up with articles and “blue papers” on 
ACFTA.134 They were policy reports drafted by the local foreign trade commissions, 
which introduced to the local government leaders and other officials the background and 
development of Sino-ASEAN relations, the facts of ACFTA, prospects of ACFTA for 
China and the province, as well as what the province should do to utilize the 
opportunities to be brought by ACFTA. 
                                                 
133 Personal interviews with experts at CASS and MOFCOM, Beijing, February 2004. 
134 Blue papers are called Lan Pi Shu in Chinese. Such reports were issued by the provinces of Yunnan, 
Guangxi, Guizhou and Sichuan. 
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The foreign economic policymaking structure between the Chinese central and 
local governments gave more assurance that the latter would comply with the former. 
Local foreign economic administration includes departments and committees 
corresponding to the central ministry and committee, namely, MOFCOM and the central 
CET. Local institutions also include the Trade Development Bureau and the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Bureau. These two are quasi-governmental shiye (enterprise) 
institutions aimed at promoting foreign trade and investment, but they are hardly 
involved in the policymaking process. A provincial department is directly managed by 
and reports to MOFCOM, and is responsible for implementing policies of MOFCOM. 
But at the same time, it should be responsible to the local government too. (See Figure 
5.1: China’s Foreign Economic Policy Making Structure) According to a local official, 
“basically policies are made at the central level, and we carry out the policies, although of 
course it is also our responsibility to help Sichuan to develop its foreign economic 
relations.”135 Regular meetings are held by the central government to hear the opinions of 
local governments. Local governments have some autonomy in implementing trade 
policies when it comes to policies related to the locality but they seldom have much 
influence in policy making. Given that ACFTA was actually a foreign policy on the 
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Figure 5.1 China’s Foreign Economic Policy Making Structure 
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            Moreover, because the working meetings on ACFTA were kept confidential and 
guests were invited to the meetings only to express their thoughts instead of making 
policies in the real sense, the meetings were generally policy briefings, or opinion 
hearings at most. People outside of MOFCOM and MFA could hardly get detailed 
information on the ACFTA. The two ministries organized the meetings and dominated 
the formation of a policy. As a matter of fact, they tried to persuade all the people about 
the significance and benefits of ACFTA. Whenever there was a conflict in opinions 
among participants, MFA and MOFTEC tried to defend ACFTA in terms of national 
interest and long-term benefits.136 Even if there were conflicts, they were not supposed to 
be known publicly. As a result, the feedbacks to ACFTA were overwhelmingly 
supportive. The reports of local governments were universally optimistic about ACFTA 
that it would bring good business opportunities, and that local enterprises should learn to 
seize the opportunities.137  
How about international actors? As mentioned previously, the business people 
including multi-national corporations (MNCs) usually express their opinions through 
ministries. However, industrial ministries could have little say in the policy making of 
ACFTA. MNCs also interact constantly with local governments because the latter have 
much manipulation in foreign economic policy implementation within their area. Again, 
in the case of ACFTA, local governments could not dampen the determination of MFA 
and MOFTEC to carry out Premier Zhu’s policy proposal. International meetings were 
held only once in April 2001 in Beijing by the Experts Group and decided that the theme 
                                                 
136 Personal interview with experts at MOFCOM Institute, Beijing, February 2004. 
137 For example, the Internal Report on ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, the Sichuan Commission of 
Foreign Trade and Foreign Economic Cooperation, obtained at Chengdu, January 2004. Also, the Yunnan 
Blue Book on Economic Opportunities in Southeast Asia, obtained from the Chinese National Library, 
Beijing, February 2004. 
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of the report was on ASEAN-China cooperation instead of China’s WTO entry and its 
challenges for ASEAN. Obviously, ASEAN countries could not refuse the good gesture 
from China. As a result, China dominated the policy formation. In their country reports 
included in the ACFTA Framework Agreement, notwithstanding some who showed 
concern over potential competition from China, the ASEAN countries generally 
welcomed the establishment of ACFTA.138 
In general, the unanimous opinion to support Premier Zhu’s proposal on ACFTA 
is understandable because Chinese government institutions and officials do not depend 
much on the support of the private sector. The first consideration of government 
institutions is to answer the call from the central government—to give positive responses 
to the policy decisions of the central government and the leadership. Moreover, except 
the core decision making circle, which included MFA, MOFTEC and a few academicians 
in this case, other actors did not really know much about the influence ACFTA would 
have in the future. As is the case with many foreign economic policies, local and private 
institutions are usually not clear with the challenges and opportunities a policy will bring. 
Their common rhetoric is that the challenges and opportunities co-exist, and opportunities 
should be seized. For most of the actors related to ACFTA, there was no choice but to 
                                                 
138 As mentioned before, Laos had some concerns over the steps of liberalization under ACFTA. Other 
countries generally expressed support and optimism to ACFTA. For example, the national report of 
Singapore states that “by virtue of its market size and abundance of relatively cheap resources, China 
development may offer opportunities for Southeast Asian economies to hitch a ride on the growth 
momentum and swing to a higher gear of development. Establishing closer economic relation with China 
will offer more information and possibilities for ASEAN countries to adapt to changes and facing 
challenges than doing otherwise.”  The national report of Vietnam, too, holds that “past experience, the 
possible outcomes of further integration of Vietnam and China together with the available amount of global 
FDI and the new requirements for development have shown that the attraction of FDI of both countries is 
not a problem of sharing ‘the same cake’.” See national reports of ten ASEAN countries, Forging Closer 
ASEAN- China Economic Relations in the Twenty-first Century, a report submitted by the ASEAN-China 
Group on Economic Cooperation, October 2001, pp. 38-144.  Online at the official website of ASEAN: 
http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm.  
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face all the possibilities brought about by the policy decided by the central government, 
or essentially, by the leadership.  
The centralization in decision making was supported by two other features in 
expediting the domestic approval of ACFTA. First, the benefits and feasibility of ACFTA 
were verified by the Chinese experts. Second, the policy making on ACFTA received 
much strategic and political input from the Chinese leadership and the MFA. 
 
The support from experts 
Many scholars observe that in the 1990s Chinese think tanks in China have 
increased their influence in policy making and made the decision making more 
democratic. 139  The Chinese experts did participate actively in the decision making 
process of ACFTA. However, the case of ACFTA provides a different perspective 
towards the role of expertise in Chinese foreign economic policymaking. Instead of 
making it more democratic and decentralized, the involvement of experts reinforced the 
centralization of the decision making.  
China’s current foreign economic policy making has much expert involvement. 
The leadership relies on expert studies and reports to reach a final decision. One of Zhu’s 
important assets was a group of advisers, many of whom were liberalist economists. He 
often leaned on economists and technocrats for policy advice. 140  Chinese foreign 
economic policy making can be said to have become more expertized than before. This is 
not to say that Chinese policymaking system has become mature or that each actor in the 
                                                 
139 See David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process.” 
The China Quarterly, 2002 Issue 171, pp. 575-596.  
Lampton, David. “Introduction.” In The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform, 1978-2000, edited by David Lampton. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2000. 
140 South China Morning Post, May 13, 1998.  
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policymaking process has expertise in the related field. Being expertized means that the 
decision making has much intellectual support from the experts. As revealed by the 
academics interviewed, compared to the 1980s, leadership since the 1990s has been more 
open to academic opinions and relies more on academic studies. The academic input has 
increased much in China’s foreign economic policy making, although the academic 
institutions often receive directions from the government to study some specific topics 
with an obvious policy preference, and their negative reports are often kept confidential. 
Comparing with the past, academia in China is now less ideological, more open-minded 
and neutral. They also enjoy much more freedom in expressing their opinions. They will 
often support foreign policies that contain the element of liberalization, such as ACFTA, 
which is seen by academia as consistent with the APEC and WTO goals.  
Moreover, because of the expert element in the reports, other people cannot easily 
rebut the validity of the policy decisions, and they could be convinced easily to support 
and implement the policies. There are many experts in China working on Sino-ASEAN 
relations, ASEAN economies, East Asian political economy, and the WTO. Academics 
played a major role in ACFTA in evaluating policies, giving policy briefings and 
reporting to the leadership about domestic and international developments. 
The expert group formed in 2000 to study ACFTA was made of people from 
academic institutions. The process of policy evaluation after Zhu’s policy initiative was 
mainly done by experts selected from the central academic institutions, namely the China 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the institute affiliated to MOFTEC. They were 
selected probably because of their proximity to the policy holders. CASS is one of the 
highest ranking research institutes in China. It is supported by the government and gives 
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policy suggestions and evaluations to the government. The Institute of Asia Pacific 
Studies at CASS has been working on East Asia and Asia Pacific cooperations. The 
Director of the Institute, Professor Zhang Yunling, was actively involved in China’s 
accession into APEC. After the Asian Crisis, the top research focus seemed to turn from 
Asia Pacific to East Asia. Two of the five-member experts group on ACFTA were 
economists from the Institute. They are both specialists and advocates on regional 
economic cooperation. Their studies would certainly support ACFTA with the economic 
rationale. 
The other members of the experts group on ACFTA came from the Institute of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation within MOFTEC. The job of the institute was 
to provide intelligence support and policy suggestions to MOFTEC. They were experts 
on China’s foreign economic relations and at the same time, they understood the 
principles of bureaucracy well. The Ministry usually gave them directions to do research 
on designated topics, usually with the intention to carry out some policies. In the case of 
ACFTA, the institute received orders from the ministry to study the feasibility of ACFTA 
and formed part of the experts group. The institute wrote an internal report on ACFTA to 
MOFTEC with a rather neutral point of view. Because the report predicted both positive 
and negative effects of ACFTA to China’s economy, the internal report has been kept 
confidential. Instead, a generally positive evaluation of ACFTA was distributed which 
was supported by economic expertise of the central research institutes.141 
Although some other local institutes also study issues related to ASEAN, they 
were not invited to the policymaking process of ACFTA. It remains a question whether 
                                                 
141 Personal interview with a researcher at the MOFCOM Institute, February 2004. The author was not able 
to obtain the confidential report but obtained the internally distributed evaluation, titled “The China-
ASEAN Free Trade Area” and written by MOFTEC experts. 
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that is because the central government was afraid of local protectionism or information 
leakage. The study of the expert group was kept confidential until the final draft was 
released at the ASEAN-China Summit in 2001. This is understandable because if local 
research institutes are involved, local governments would influence the policy making 
process through the research institutes. It was likely that local governments would 
impede the process of decision making if they were worried about the negative effects of 
ACFTA. It was only in the implementation period that local institutes began participating 
in local policy making. They in turn supported the policy decision of the central 
government on ACFTA with considerations of local interests. They also provided policy 
suggestions for local governments and industries to take the opportunities created by 
ACFTA.  
As a result, the policy evaluation was kept to a few experts at the government-
linked central institutes in Beijing, namely CASS and the Institute at MOFTEC. Their 
study was well directed by the political aims of the leadership. From the discussions 
above, it can be seen that the involvement of experts reinforced the centralization in 
decision making on ACFTA.  
 
Strategic and political inputs 
The strategic and political inputs of ACFTA were not only reflected in the policy 
considerations on ACFTA but also in the policymaking process. When the leadership 
played the most decisive role in the foreign policymaking process, foreign economic 
policies are heavily influenced by the strategic and political thinking of the leadership. In 
various statements about ACFTA, Chinese leaders stressed that Sino-ASEAN relations 
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are very important to the stability and security of the region. They also held that China 
and ASEAN were important for establishing a multi-polar world order. Their statements 
clearly embodied the strategic and political thinking of the Chinese leadership on ACFTA. 
As analyzed in the previous chapters, the goals of China pursuing cooperation with 
ASEAN were not only economic benefits for China but also for gaining respect and 
manageability. ACFTA made an ideal mechanism for realizing these goals. Zhu proposed 
ACFTA in response to ASEAN’s worries about China’s threat. The economic policy 
certainly contains much strategic reasoning.  
The political input into ACFTA was also embodied by the relations between 
ministries involved in the policymaking process. As mentioned previously, MFA played 
the dominating role in the formulation of ACFTA instead of MOFTEC although the latter 
was in charge of foreign economic policies. A close advisor to China’s economic policy 
noted that the ability of China’s synthesis between political and economic issues should 
not be overestimated.142 However, the Chinese scholars generally hold that as China 
slowly integrates into the world with more interactions with various international actors, 
Beijing has seen the drawback and risk of uncoordinated policy making, and began to 
have more far-sighted and coordinated policies. The Chinese government often attach 
substantial political and strategic thinking in dealing with economic issues, especially for 
issues related to regionalization and globalization. 
The transfer of responsibility from MFA in the preparation period to MOFTEC in 
the negotiation period was the result of coordination between MFA and MOFTEC, 
                                                 
142 Personal interview with a senior scholar at the Institute of World Economy and Politics at CASS, 
Beijing, February 2004. 
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instead of the order from the leadership.143 It was a division of labour based on the 
different functions of the two ministries, as well as on their expectations of ACFTA. 
MFA had the leading position in the policy evaluation process which was decisive as to 
whether and how fast the policy would be approved domestically. Because MFA cares 
most for China’s foreign political relations, its aim for ACFTA was to make sure that the 
framework agreement would be signed by the governments and that the proposal would 
be approved by the domestic actors. Because economic interests were diversified among 
various actors, it was easier to persuade them to agree with the ACFTA for reasons 
beyond economic ends. This task of persuasion would be best done by MFA.  Therefore 
it was natural for MFA to assume the leading position in the policy evaluation period 
although ACFTA was an economic arrangement in nature. When the in-principle 
approval was achieved from domestic and international actors, MFA had completed its 
task. The torch was handed over to MOFTEC for implementation which would require 
much more economic expertise.  
On the other hand, MOFTEC cares most for carrying out national strategies for 
foreign economic relations. It wanted to make sure that the ACFTA would be realized 
and China’s economic interactions with ASEAN would be substantially expanded. 
Certainly MOFTEC would have to keep the tariff reductions and relevant economic 
situations in control. It would like to realize the politically-set goals with the lowest 
economic costs. In the negotiation period of the agreement, it aimed to promote relations 
with their counterparts in ASEAN countries. The ACFTA provided MOFTEC with a 
                                                 
143 Personal interview with a scholar at CASS, who was a member of the ASEAN-China Experts Group, 
Beijing, February 2004. 
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good chance to gain influence over issues in Sino-ASEAN economic relations and in 
regional economic relations. 
 
In summary, China’s policymaking process on ACFTA was prominently 
centralized. Firstly, the charismatic leadership of Zhu Rongji enjoyed high authority and 
reverence. Secondly, the relevant central ministries dominated the policymaking process 
and were following the leadership’s direction. Thirdly, other actors could hardly have any 
significant influence on the policy outcome. The policy making process involved much 
participation of Chinese experts, with intellectual support from the academia for the 
legitimacy of the ACFTA proposal. Finally, China’s policy of ACFTA was obviously 
strategic, with political and strategic motivations stemming from the foreign economic 
policy making. The combination of these factors facilitated the approval of ACFTA. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
The phenomenon explained in this study is the substantial enhancement of 
China’s economic cooperation with ASEAN in the 1990s, which consummated in the 
endorsement of a framework ACFTA at the ASEAN-China Summit in 2001 and its 
formal signing in 2002. The study addresses one central question: what are the current 
characteristics in Chinese foreign economic policy making that have facilitated its 
cooperative economic policies with ASEAN? 
Those characteristics are searched at both international and domestic levels. That 
is because this study believes that formulation of foreign economic policy can be best 
explained both from the policy considerations in international relations and from the 
policy making process in domestic politics. The policy considerations generally aim at 
pursuing national interests including political, strategic and economic benefits. These 
considerations are influenced by the international relations, the status of the country, the 
expectations for the future of the country and the perceptions of policymakers as to the 
definition of national interests. The policy making process, on the other hand, is likely to 
be influenced by the domestic policy making structure, the interests of domestic actors 
and the relations among them. However, it is problematic if one were to integrate both 
levels of analysis. This is partly because the domestic actors may not associate their 
interests directly with international relations, and therefore their considerations on a 
policy may not involve factors in the international environment. However, international 
factors are undeniably important to a country in its foreign economic policy making and 
are usually referred to in policy evaluation by the state leadership. This study firstly 
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analyzes the factors at the international level to explain why China has chosen a 
cooperative foreign economic policy towards ASEAN; and secondly it unveils a picture 
of the Chinese foreign economic policymaking process from the case of ACFTA.  
At the international level, it firstly inquires whether it is mainly out of economic 
or political considerations that China has pursued economic cooperation with ASEAN. 
The location of ASEAN is identified in the map of China’s foreign economic relations in 
comparison with that of Japan, the US and the EU. Through statistical analysis of Sino-
ASEAN trade and investment relations, it is found that ASEAN does not make up a 
significant portion in China’s foreign trade, nor is it a major source of foreign direct 
investments in China. Moreover, China and ASEAN have similar structures of exported 
goods. In other words, ASEAN does not have the economic advantages in forming an 
FTA with China when compared to some other economies. However, the figures of Sino-
ASEAN economic relations have been growing very fast since the late 1990s. Notably, 
coherences are found between China’s fastest increasing exports and ASEAN’s fastest 
increasing imports, and vice versa for the former’s imports and the latter’s exports. The 
fast growth despite disadvantages in their natural endowments in economic relations 
indicates strong government initiatives especially from the Chinese side. The most likely 
explanation is that ASEAN enjoys strategic priority in China’s foreign economic 
relations.   
Then, what is China’s strategy in its foreign economic relations? It is argued that 
respect and manageability are the two central themes when China decides policies on 
regional and international economic arrangement.  
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Firstly, China tries to gain respect from the international community. It seeks the 
image of a responsible and valuable actor. It tries to diminish the worry of its threat to 
other countries.  It stresses its determination and ability to contribute to international 
cooperation and development. If China participates in the arrangement, the utility of an 
international economic arrangement for China to gain international respect can be 
measured by several criteria. First, China is fulfilling international obligations and 
advocating international norms. Second, China has the goodwill and ability to help other 
countries to overcome problems and achieve development. Third, China plays an 
important role in promoting regional economic cooperation. Fourth, the proposed 
international arrangement would most likely be successfully realized and be influential in 
the international society. By pursuing international respect, China expects to raise its 
international status, to maintain sovereignty on several key issues and to achieve 
cooperation from other countries. It is trying to create a friendly and respectful 
international environment for its economic development. Moreover, China sees the 
dynamics in East Asian international relations as an opportunity for it to resume the status 
of a big power in the region. 
Secondly, China tries to maintain manageability over its national policies and the 
regional collective policies. It would not be satisfied with a respectable arrangement that 
is not manageable. Whether China can maintain manageability over its national and 
regional collective policies is measured by three criteria. They are: bilateral arrangements 
are easier to manage than multilateral ones; voluntary implementation is more 
manageable than compulsory implementation; and, the more prevailing power China has 
among the group members, the more manageability China has in the decision making of 
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the international arrangement. With its accelerating integration into the world economy, 
China cautions against losing control over its national policies. Maintaining control over 
its own policies is a precondition to China’s participating in international arrangements.  
Moreover, with its rising state power, China has begun to increase its influence in 
regional and international collective policy decisions. Having envisioned the potential 
development of regional cooperation, China tries to keep the regional collective policies 
in the scope of its manageability. 
The hypothesis of respect and manageability is tested by studying several cases of 
China’s policies towards regional and international economic arrangements since the 
1990s. In each case, seven criteria are applied to the regional or international economic 
arrangement. The assessment of their utilities is analyzed to see whether they are related 
to China’s policy towards that arrangement.  
Those regional and international economic arrangements are divided into two 
categories: proposed arrangemetns and existing arrangements. The first category includes 
policy proposals for regional economic cooperation, such as EAEG, AMF, and EAFTA. 
China’s consideration of the proposals of international economic arrangements is based 
on its predictions over the utilities of the proposed arrangement for China and China’s 
possible role in it if it were formed. The proposed arrangements should be able to 
increase China’s international respect while it should assure China of its manageability 
over the national and collective international economic policies. In the aspect of 
increasing international respect, the utilities of the regional cooperation proposals have 
similarity in that if the proposal is accepted, China will be one of the founding members 
and will be respected for promoting regional cooperation and economic liberalization. 
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Therefore, whether regional cooperation will probably achieve success and international 
influence bares crucial weight in China’s consideration. Some arrangements were not 
expected by China to have an optimistic future, and even if China took part in it, they 
would not be very useful to enhance international respect for China. This was 
exemplified in the cases of the EAEG and the EAFTA, although they might form a strong 
East Asian voice against the US dominance in the region. In the aspect of manageability, 
it is discernible that China is very cautious about proposed regional economic 
cooperation arrangements if they have a legally binding nature or authority to limit 
national policies of the member countries, as in the cases of the EAFTA and the AMF. 
China will consider the possible power distribution among the proposed members and if 
China does not expect to have a prevailing power over the international collective 
policies, the arrangement is considered to increase the risk of China’s economic policies 
being controlled by other countries. In such situations, China is not willing to support the 
realization of the proposed arrangement. It may even try to block it. It is worth 
mentioning that refusal on regional cooperation proposals is considered by China to cost 
less than losing manageability over its economic policies. This may be acceptable in the 
current stage of East Asian cooperation, which is still largely informal. Refusal is one 
plausible choice for China because Asian diplomacy is usually informal, indirect and the 
institutional developments in Asia are still at a very primitive stage. It will not cause 
much international defiance if China is not very supportive. Moreover, refusal of one 
proposal can be compensated by supporting or initiating other arrangements that are 
considered to be more beneficial for China. 
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The second category includes existing regional and international arrangements 
such as CMI, ASEAN+3, APEC and the WTO. They have achieved a certain degree of 
success and international influence, and therefore China does not wish to be excluded. 
When China has to join an international economic arrangement, China tries to minimize 
loss of manageability over its national policies and to increase manageability over the 
collective international decisions. In a more general term, China tries to lessen the 
damages and improve the returns. Chinese policies towards these arrangements vary in its 
behaviours of participation. This can be observed with the degree of activeness or 
passiveness. China’s policymaking over the existing international economic 
arrangements involves evaluation of the current situations of the arrangement, evaluation 
of its utilities for China, predictions of its future developments, and the perceived role of 
China within it. For example, because the CMI is beneficial to China’s image as a 
respectable member in the East Asian regionalism and at the same time does not render 
China’s manageability over its own policies at risk, China has participated in it fairly 
actively. However, China is not eager to propel further development of the current 
bilateral CMI towards a regional multilateral arrangement. China is very supportive of 
the ASEAN+3 framework because it signifies the leading role of ASEAN in East Asian 
cooperation process. China’s support for ASEAN’s leadership can gain respect from the 
latter. Moreover, Sino-ASEAN relations are more manageable for China than an East 
Asian economic group or an EAFTA that is led by Japan.  Building ties with ASEAN 
through ASEAN+3 is also a strategy of China to exert influence on regional policies. 
China compromised on Taiwan’s membership in order to enter APEC because it has to be 
a member of the only inter-governmental economic organization in the Asia Pacific. It 
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advocates the rights of developing countries in APEC to get respect from those countries 
and to win itself some room for flexibility. It is also very passive towards some proposals 
from the Western members to institutionalize trade liberalization within APEC because it 
is worried about losing control over its national policies to the stronger member 
economies such as Japan or the US. China painstakingly pursued the WTO membership 
because it did not want to be isolated from the global trade system. By joining the WTO, 
it can claim to be a responsible actor in the enterprise of global economic liberalization 
and a representative of the developing countries, thereby augmenting international 
respect for China. At the same time, it insisted on its status of a developing country to 
enjoy special treatments and tries to keep a moderate pace of implementation of WTO 
practices. China also tries to make the developing countries cooperate with it in order to 
balance the domination of developed countries in the global trade system. 
When the aspects of respect and manageability are summarized in the above cases, 
traces of relationship between these aspects and China’s policies are more obvious. From 
China’s perspective, when it can get high respect and maintain high manageability from 
an international economic arrangement, it will support it or even take the initiative, such 
as in the cases of the CMI and ASEAN+3. When China has to participate to get 
international respect but is not sure to maintain much manageability over its own policies 
as in APEC and WTO, China participates but does not propel it. Instead, China tries to 
minimize the loss of manageability by seeking flexibility, support from other developing 
countries, and a more favourable environment for China. When China can maintain high 
manageability over its own policy but does not envision much international respect to be 
obtained from an arrangement, it keeps a low profile as in the case of the EAEC. When 
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neither high respect nor manageability can be achieved such as in the cases of AMF and 
EAFTA proposals, China tends to oppose the economic cooperation arrangement. 
Following the same logic, China has pursued economic cooperation with ASEAN 
because it brings high international respect to China and at the same time enables China 
to keep considerable manageability over national and regional policy decisions. ACFTA 
is an ideal arrangement for China to achieve the two objectives. China can win ASEAN’s 
respect for its goodwill and ability to help Southeast Asian economies. It is consistent 
with China’s promise to cooperate with and integrate into the outside world. It earned 
China credit for making a major breakthrough in East Asian economic cooperation, 
which can trigger more regional free trade agreements and be a building block for 
regional or global free trade. In many ways, ACFTA is basically a bilateral agreement 
and therefore quite manageable for China. The compulsory nature of ACFTA can assure 
ASEAN of China’s commitment to the development of Southeast Asia while China can 
gain experience of dealing with legally binding international agreements with little risk of 
losing control over its national policies. More importantly, during the process of building 
the free trade area, China can keep forging closer relations with ASEAN on the latter’s 
expectation of tapping into China’s market and investment.  ACFTA is a clear message 
that China will be more active in international economic issues, especially in designing 
and restructuring international trade regimes. In a word, ACFTA and economic 
cooperation with ASEAN satisfies China’s overall strategy in foreign economic policy 
making. 
On the domestic level, the characteristics of Chinese foreign economic 
policymaking process facilitated the domestic approval on the ACFTA. Chinese policy 
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making on ACFTA was highly centralized. Zhu Rongji exercised charismatic leadership 
in China’s foreign economic policy making during his term as the Chinese Premier. He 
played the most decisive role in initiating and propelling the signing of ACFTA. 
Compliance with leadership decisions is firmly held in Chinese foreign policy 
bureaucracy. After ACFTA was proposed by Zhu in 2000, the evaluation period was 
organized by MFA and MOFTEC. Both were determined and skilful in pushing through 
the proposal. Evidently, the spirit of ACFTA was in line with the mainstream belief of 
MFA and MOFTEC. Both aimed to promote good relations with ASEAN, and the latter 
believed in China’s economic liberalization. Other marginal actors, including the 
academia, industrial ministries and local governments were invited by the two organizing 
ministries to working meetings to discuss the possible effects and feasibility of ACFTA. 
Although different opinions were expressed at the meetings, the two ministries managed 
to persuade people of the significance and benefits of ACFTA. Business people could 
hardly have any influence because the main channel for them to express opinions is the 
industrial ministries. Limited by the availability of information and expertise, as well as 
their marginal status in policy making, other domestic actors had to accept the ACFTA 
proposal with the hope for economic opportunities. 
The centralization in decision making was supported by two other features in 
expediting the domestic approval of ACFTA. First, the decision making has much 
intellectual support from the experts. Academia played an active role in the initial study, 
evaluation and drafting of ACFTA. The merit and feasibility of ACFTA were verified by 
several Chinese experts appointed by the government. It is observed that instead of 
making Chinese policymaking more democratic and decentralized, the role of academics 
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can be reinforcing centralization. Having said this, it should be noted that the selected 
experts from CASS and MOFTEC were advocates of China’s cooperation with other 
Asian countries. They have provided strong support for policies on China’s foreign 
economic cooperation. 
Second, the policy making on ACFTA received much strategic and political input. 
The initiative of Zhu Rongji was mostly out of strategic and political considerations. In 
the policymaking process, the MFA which was in charge of foreign political affairs led 
the policy evaluation period, which was most crucial to the formulation of the ACFTA 
agreement. The MOFTEC which was in charge of foreign economic relations took over 
the main responsibility only after the framework agreement was signed and the 
negotiation period started. Although MOFTEC was the major government ministry to 
make foreign economic policies, it often consulted with the MFA for political 
considerations. The political and strategic considerations were the most important factors 
in the initiation, evaluation and formulation of ACFTA. 
All in all, the combination of international and domestic factors led the policy 
proposal of ACFTA to be smoothly adopted by China. Respect and manageability are 
two central concerns when China makes policies on regional and international economic 
arrangements. Cooperation with ASEAN suits the two criteria better than others, and 
therefore China pursued ACFTA with the latter. The centralized Chinese foreign 
economic policymaking process facilitated the domestic approval of ACFTA. This was 
facilitated by the expertise and political inputs into the policymaking.  
Through ACFTA, China continues to pursue the goal of gaining international 
respect, maintaining control over its own policies and increasing control over regional 
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collective policies. This is in tandem with its rising economic and political status in the 
world. This study highlights the foreign policymaking of a rising and liberalizing country. 
As such, China needs to maintain the balance between cooperation and manageability, 
between regional participation and global participation, as well as between politics and 
economy.   
With its economic development, China wishes to project an image of being 
willing and capable to cooperate with and contribute to the outside world. It selects 
international cooperation arrangements carefully which will have a bright future for 
success and international influence. It needs to seek cooperation from other countries for 
its economic development as well as political and strategic interests. It has realized the 
necessity to learn the rules and skills in international arrangements. Therefore it has 
become more active in participating, initiating, and contributing to international 
cooperations. At the same time, China is afraid of losing control over its national policies 
to other countries or international regimes. It tries to maintain autonomy and flexibility in 
its policy decisions in an international arrangement. Moreover, China wishes to maintain 
and increase manageability in its international relations. It prefers to form cooperative 
arrangements with countries over which it has advantage and influence, compared to 
countries which are stronger in economy and influence. It makes more efforts in shaping 
international institutions and encourages the role of its partners. It also tries to utilize its 
potential as a rising country to gain international influence. It seems to be waiting for a 
right moment to promote enhanced international cooperation when it has gained more 
power. At this moment, it is trying to keep a balance between cooperation and 
manageability. 
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China also needs to keep a balance between its participation in regionalism and 
globalism. This is a question for many countries in the debate of the impact of 
regionalism over globalism. On the one hand, China needs to show its dedication to the 
regional cooperation process. On the other hand, China needs to be committed to its 
obligations in global economic cooperation. It tries to make the regional members 
relieved from the fear of a China threat and claims that it would not be a regional 
hegemon. When it does not have confidence in participating in global institutions, the 
region is a buffer zone and support for its adventure in the global game. Therefore, China 
seems to put priority on regional cooperation over globalization in its process of 
integrating into the world. It opposes the institutionalization of APEC and tries to bargain 
for flexibility in the implementation of WTO requirements. In the meantime, it has 
started preferential arrangement with regional countries. 
Keeping a wise balance between political policies and economic policies is a 
challenge for China. It needs sound economic policies for its economic development, but 
at the same time, political and strategic considerations weigh heavily in current Chinese 
foreign relations. In some cases, the latter has a leading role in the policymaking. For 
example, in the case of the ACFTA policymaking, China was able to sacrifice some 
economic interests for pursuing political and strategic goals. However, how much 
economic interests China can sacrifice without being opposed by the domestic actors is 
uncertain. With the increasing involvement of numerous economic interests, domestic 
actors may not be willing or able to accept government policies, especially for those 
related to their benefits. The coordination between the ministries in charge of political 
and economic issues is not institutionalized as well. It is questionable whether the 
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sequential division of labour between the political and economic ministries in the 
policymaking process of ACFTA was an ideal way to make policies that are based on 
both political and economic reasoning. It is notable that the domination of political 
factors can be beneficial for a country to form economic cooperation with its perceived 
strategic partners. 
As to the policymaking process, it is debatable whether democratic countries are 
more likely to cooperate with others. The Chinese policymaking process of ACFTA was 
highly centralized. It can be argued that centralized policymaking structure facilitate the 
domestic approval of the policy proposal. This is because the central government is able 
to persuade various domestic actors to accept its decision despite possible adverse 
impacts on their economic interests. Certainly this is provided that the most decisive 
policymakers support international cooperation. While most literature on regional 
economic cooperation is based on Western experiences, this study suggests that Asian 
regional cooperation may proceed with a different manner. Non-democratic countries or 
non-market economies are also able to form economic cooperation arrangements. 
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the most cooperative countries are those in which 
the supporters for international cooperation have a dominant influence on the foreign 
economic policymaking in their own country. Having said this, uncertainty remains in the 
persuasive power of the Chinese government. Although it was able to keep some 
domestic actors away from the formal decision process of ACFTA, this was done through 
highly centralized arrangement. As China has embarked on economic liberalization, it is 
doubtful that the Chinese government can maintain the highly centralized policymaking 
structure when other domestic and international actors gain more economic significance. 
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It is worth testing whether a similar pattern can exist in other areas and times of Chinese 
foreign economic policymaking structure. 
Because China and many ASEAN countries have similar economic structures, the 
difficulties in the implementation period of ACFTA remain to be seen. The dynamics 
between non-market economy and international cooperation will also be shown in the 
future. The strategy of gaining respect and manageability in current Chinese foreign 
economic policies may be subject to change in response to future international and 
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Table A1 China's exports (fob) to Japan, EU, US and ASEAN (US $mn) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Japan   9210.4 10251.8 11699.3 15782.3 21489.8 28466.4 30888.3 31819.8 29718.1 32399.1 41654.0 45078.2 48483.0 
EU  5945.6 6709.7 7463.1 11646.4 14595.8 18076.3 18810.6 23870.8 28161.9 30244.8 38230.3 41017.3 48233.9 
USA  5313.9 6198.0 8598.8 16976.5 21421.4 24743.9 26730.6 32743.9 38000.6 42003.1 52161.7 54395.1 70063.8 
ASEAN  4150.7 4456.2 4667.8 5342.9 7165.8 10474.6 10319.0 12703.1 11032.4 12274.8 17341.3 18571.2 23574.0 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. From Global Market Database. 
 
Table A2 Growth rates of the share of ASEAN, Japan, EU and US in China's outward exports 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ASEAN -0.07 -0.11 0.06 0.02 0.19 -0.03 0.02 -0.14 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.04
Japan -0.04 -0.03 0.25 0.03 0.08 0.07 -0.15 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.12
EU -0.03 -0.06 0.44 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04
US 0.01 0.17 0.83 -0.04 -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.05






Table A3 Growth Rates of China’s Export Commodities (1991-2001) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
machinery and transport equipment 0.28 -0.05 0.16 0.43 0.43 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.40 0.15 
chemicals 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.35 0.45 -0.02 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.10 
miscellaneous manufactured goods 0.27 0.51 0.13 0.29 0.09 0.04 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.01 
food and live animals 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.17 0.04 
basic manufactures 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.42 0.38 -0.11 0.20 -0.06 0.02 0.28 0.03 
beverages and tobacco 0.55 0.36 0.25 0.11 0.37 -0.02 -0.22 -0.07 -0.21 -0.03 0.17 
crude materials exc. fuels -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 0.35 0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.16 0.12 0.14 -0.07 
mineral fuels -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.31 0.11 0.18 -0.26 -0.10 0.69 0.07 
other goods -0.37 -0.40 -0.10 -0.08 0.51 -0.60 0.75 -0.34 -0.27 1.80 0.13 
oils and fats -0.07 -0.08 0.48 1.41 -0.08 -0.17 0.72 -0.53 -0.57 -0.12 -0.04 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. From Global Market Database. 
 
Table A4 Growth Rates of ASEAN’s Import Commodities (1991-2001)  
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
oils and fats 0.27 0.24 -0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.23 0.07 -0.05 0.07 -0.28 -0.02 
food and live animals 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.24 0.15 -0.07 -0.18 0.07 -0.02 0.03 
chemicals 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.27 -0.03 -0.02 -0.23 0.12 0.20 -0.07 
machinery and transport equipment 0.20 0.10 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.08 0.00 -0.25 0.02 0.27 -0.11 
miscellaneous manufactured goods 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.01 -0.26 0.09 0.17 -0.14 
crude materials exc. fuels 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.27 -0.02 -0.11 -0.27 0.10 0.20 -0.06 
beverages and tobacco 0.16 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.07 -0.28 -0.03 0.03 0.04 
basic manufactures 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.29 -0.02 -0.05 -0.31 0.05 0.13 -0.08 
mineral fuels 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.24 0.01 -0.34 0.26 0.63 -0.07 
other goods -0.34 0.58 0.30 0.27 0.33 -0.40 -0.05 -0.39 1.71 -0.59 0.09 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. From Global Market Database. 
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Table A5 Growth Rates of China’s Import Commodities (1991-2001) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
food and live animals -0.14 0.06 -0.30 0.42 0.95 -0.08 -0.24 -0.12 -0.05 0.32 0.05 
beverages and tobacco 0.28 0.19 0.03 -0.72 4.79 0.26 -0.36 -0.44 0.16 0.75 0.13 
crude materials exc. fuels 0.22 0.10 -0.05 0.38 0.37 0.06 0.12 -0.10 0.19 0.57 0.11 
mineral fuels 0.66 0.71 0.62 -0.30 0.27 0.34 0.50 -0.34 0.32 1.31 -0.15 
oils and fats -0.27 -0.28 -0.04 2.62 0.44 -0.35 -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 -0.29 -0.22 
chemicals 0.40 0.19 -0.13 0.25 0.41 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.26 0.06 
basic manufactures 0.19 0.45 0.46 -0.02 0.01 0.10 0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.22 0.00 
machinery and transport equipment 0.19 0.20 0.45 0.16 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.22 0.32 0.16 
miscellaneous manufactured goods 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.10 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.32 0.19 
other goods -0.24 1.74 0.23 0.03 1.14 -0.51 0.22 -0.17 0.79 0.24 -0.03 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. From Global Market Database. 
 
Table A6 Growth Rates of ASEAN’s Export Commodities (1991-2001) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
machinery and transport equipment 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.40 0.27 0.13 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.32 -0.14 
miscellaneous manufactured goods 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.20 -0.04 
mineral fuels 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.19 -0.01 -0.23 0.18 0.51 -0.17 
basic manufactures 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.03 -0.04 -0.14 0.11 0.12 -0.08 
chemicals 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.22 0.38 0.01 0.12 -0.04 0.20 0.20 -0.01 
food and live animals 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
crude materials exc. fuels 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.16 0.31 -0.05 -0.15 -0.22 -0.03 0.20 -0.13 
other goods -0.59 2.16 0.34 0.11 0.57 -0.52 1.65 -0.07 0.82 -0.81 0.99 
oils and fats 0.07 0.24 0.00 0.42 0.24 -0.07 0.11 0.00 -0.09 -0.19 -0.09 
beverages and tobacco 0.38 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.02 -0.13 -0.19 0.01 0.00 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. From Global Market Database.  
